Assessing the election outcome

TREVOR SUDAMA

AN assessment of the possible outcome of the 2025 general election should take into account the relevance of the following factors:

1. The first-past-the-post electoral system places emphasis on the winning of constituencies defined by geographic boundaries. It therefore favours parties which can command concentrated and significant support in defined geographical areas.

2. The history of electoral outcomes over the past seven decades indicates that voters have generally favoured two parties from among those competing for the seats available in the House of Representatives.

3. Parties in Trinidad, other than the two electorally dominant ones, have not had a happy experience at the polls and are extremely unlikely to win any seat.

4. A number of emotive responses generally determine voting patterns which can range from racial and kinship sentiment, religious and cultural affiliation, community allegiance and interconnectedness (geography), preservation of class and status quo privileges, and the intensity of discontent with existing representation.

5. Racial and kinship sentiment is a major motivation for many voters which may secure seats but does not determine overall successful electoral outcomes.

6. Those motivated by so-called rational considerations exemplified by meticulous examination of manifestos, platform pledges, political arguments, the assessment of the character, capacity and background of candidates, etc constitute a small minority of the electorate.

7. There is some degree of disenchantment among supporters of both the PNM and the UNC and it is uncertain where the greater degree of disenchantment lies. The response of disenchanted voters is mixed. For some, there will be a great deal of soul-searching but they will continue to vote for the party traditionally supported. A number of them will abstain from voting. Others will transfer their support to another party.

8. If it is a close contest, the independent and non-aligned voters persuaded to exercise their franchise in the marginal constituencies and those who are disenchanted and willing to transfer their support in these constituencies will determine which of the two electorally dominant parties wins a majority of the seats.

9. Elections are basically fought at two levels – the national level and the constituency level. At the national level it is the quality and relevance of the campaign message conveyed and the image of the party that is created which will have an impact. At the constituency level, it is the diligence and effectiveness of canvassing and mobilisation which would matter.

Given the above considerations, it is highly unlikely, as indicated above, that any of the third parties will win any seat. The very few which will be able to command some support may have an impact in the marginal constituencies in a close contest in which victory is likely to be determined by a few hundred votes. However, given the historical solidity of the PNM support base, the votes for third parties are likely to come from the pool of voters opposed to the PNM.

Since the 2025 electoral contest will be reduced to one between the PNM and the UNC, their prospects in terms of advantages and disadvantages may throw some light on the possible outcome.

The advantages of the PNM include (a) incumbency and control of the Treasury, (b) a larger campaign war chest with more deep-pocketed donors, (c) a proven effective regime for the purposes of electoral mobilisation, (d) a new relatively young leader who may likely attract more Indo-Trinidadian and other support for the party, (e) the perception of greater readiness and planning.

However, if the disenchantment with the PNM is intense and pervasive enough across geographical areas, communities, ethnicities and classes, then the advantages listed above will count for little.

The disadvantages for the PNM are as follows: (a) the leader is perceived as not having depth of political experience, a dominating platform presence, commanding rhetoric and communication skills, (b) was appointed to the position instead of elected, (c) the leader was a key member (perceived as second in command) of the PNM government for the last ten years and cannot escape responsibility for the stagnating economy, the abysmal lack of safety and security of citizens, the woeful inadequacy and dysfunctionality of basic physical and social infrastructure, and the steady erosion of the integrity, standing and performance of critical state institutions.

For the UNC, the advantages claimed are (a) the leader has more governing experience, greater empathy with the struggles of the common man, superior public relations and communication skills, (b) the performance of the PP government delivered improved living conditions, more comprehensive delivery of benefits, and a more stable economy.

However, on the negative side there is (a) the perception of the leader as an ageing combatant past her prime, saddled with a loser image, making decisions on an ad hoc and whimsical basis, and alienating support, (c) the view that the UNC is not fully prepared and mobilised and expediently reaching out for alliances with little electoral vote, (d) the UNC unity is compromised by many defections.

Since the goal of the UNC is to replace the incumbent PNM, its prospects of winning the election hinge on its capacity to hold on to its current 19 seats in the House and win at least two of the marginals to obtain the minimum of 21 seats.

This means that the UNC has to consolidate its support in such seats as Moruga/Tableland, Mayaro, Claxton Bay, San Juan/Barataria, Chaguanas East, as well as persuade the majority of the uncommitted, non-aligned and disenchanted electors to vote for it in seats such as San Fernando West, Aranguez/St Joseph, Tunapuna, La Horquetta/Talparo and Toco/Sangre Grande.

It is quite a tall and challenging order.