A decade of turmoil: Tobago 1770-1780

Dr Rita Pemberton

THE OPTIMISM that accompanied British possession of Tobago in 1763 lasted barely seven years before the grim realities of establishing a plantation culture with enslaved labour in forested terrain enveloped the island’s planter elite.

That Britain’s claim to the island was endorsed at the treaty table stimulated not simply a sense of military victory over France, but also of an economic victory, with the expectation of profits that could accrue to British investors and the British crown, of which the French would be deprived.

Accounts of the state of the island at the time of its acquisition, which lauded its potential for agricultural enterprise, were in wide circulation among members of the British business community. They were accepted without question, and it was generally believed possession of Tobago was the path to wealth.

Hence the island attracted wealthy investors and plantation owners from other colonies and a significant population of young male fortune-seekers, who expected the island to provide opportunities for wealth acquisition. The British rolled out a development plan to fast-track its conversion into a plantation colony, which proved neither easy nor straightforward.

Despite the descriptions of Tobago as a wealthy sugar colony, the incipient years of the plantation industry were fraught with challenges which frustrated the planting community.

In 1770 the island was faced with the stark reality of its defencelessness, posed by three developments. First was the outbreak of resistance by the enslaved population, the “desperadoes” who dared to seek liberation either by open attack on their enslavers or as maroon gangs who operated from the forests and made periodic attacks on plantations.

This was the island’s first insurrection, which shocked the planting community, who hitherto misled themselves into the belief that the enslaved population was, as described from time to time, contented, loyal, devoted and trustworthy.

To prevent further outbreaks, the Tobago Council saw the need to inflict brutal punishment on those resisters who were caught, and for the institution of “proper” slave law.

However, what was expressed as most disconcerting to the planter was that the enslaved population was aware of the vulnerability of the island because of its lack of a well-regulated militia and adequate defences, particularly around its many bays.

The 70s witnessed six other resistance efforts by enslaved Africans. A second revolt occurred at the end of 1770, and two attempts each were made in 1771 and 1773 and one in 1774.

In addition, maritime marronage was a continuous occurrence. Planters lamented that Spanish Trinidad presented a major problem for managing the enslaved population, as a haven for runaways from Tobago from which they could not be retrieved. The council proposed discussions with the Spanish authorities on an agreement to return runaways to Tobago. This never materialised.

The spate of insurrections was very costly: plantation property was destroyed by fires, enslaved labourers lost and plantation operations disrupted.

In addition, planters also suffered the ravages of a pestilence of ants in 1771/1772 which destroyed some sugar estates.

These costs were considered onerous on new plantation owners, who had heavy financial commitments. Having only recently started to make payments for their properties, they were faced with additional costs to repair the damage caused by revolts and for additional defence in the face of the crisis.

Also, the insurrections occurred at a time when it was considered urgent to spread good news about the island to encourage increased settlement and investments. The tone of the communication of Governor Melville to the Secretary of State tried to assure the imperial authorities that reports of the insurrection were exaggerated, and the inhabitants and garrison had matters well under control.

While it was admitted that the resistance brought a significant public cost, Melville was very dismissal about the second insurrection, which he claimed was handled by the "quick and judicious measures” of Lt Gov Young, which dispersed the rebels into the forests, from which they were subsequently extracted.

While it sought to do damage repair to the island’s image, this communication did not reflect the level of panic that overcame Tobago planters in their efforts to secure their properties.

The defence question, one of the main sore points for the administration from the earliest years of British possession, presented the second challenge to the new colony. Concern about inadequate defences expressed by members of the planting community was one of the main reasons for the request for a council to take direct charge of the colony's needs.

Once established, defence matters dominated communication from the council to the imperial government. Despite the awareness that France still hovered, waiting for an opportunity to invade and reclaim the island, the imperial government had not responded to these concerns and failed to provide adequate defences.

In addition, the activities of pirates and privateers created problems for the new colony. Ships bringing goods were captured, raids made on estates, and enslaved workers and plantation property were stolen. This resulted in increased costs in plantation operations and underscored the need for a strong military force to deal with both internal and external opponents.

The third development came from imperial sources. Despite the disruption of the island’s plantation operations, owners were further traumatised by the announcement that the imperial authorities were insisting they honour their financial commitments, made when properties were purchased under arrangements with the Land Commissioners.

In 1775, the panicked planters sent a petition to the Secretary of State which referred to the unforeseen disappointments, losses and misfortunes experienced in the colony, which, they admitted, had reduced it to “its lowest ebb.”

They argued that the threat of prosecution for nonpayment of instalments on land was unfair, because there were also breaches of the agreement on the part of the imperial authorities. Roads were not laid out as promised, and there was little communication with half the island, which made it easy for rebellions to occur. The burden of establishing roads fell on the landowners, who needed to be able to contact each other for security purposes.

They also complained about the significant increases in the price of land sold by the Land Commissioners. Land for plantations, first sold at 35 shillings an acre, was currently being sold at £5 per acre. Given imperial non-compliance and inconsistency in the terms of sale, inadequate provision of defence and other services, additional burdens were placed on planters’ costs to compensate for imperial deficiencies. It was a plea for a stay of execution.

During the second part of the decade there was no satisfactory resolution to the matters that plagued the new colony. Defence provisions remained unsatisfactory, the enslaved population remained unstable, pirates and privateers continued to fleece the island and there were signs of increased French activity around Tobago.

It was clear a French invasion was imminent, and the island was no better prepared than at the start of the decade. It became impossible to attract investors by "sterilising" news about Tobago’s realities.