Alternative to state of emergency

THE EDITOR: I humbly propose the following anti-crime measure for the relevant authorities to consider.

This is based on the premise that there are an estimated three gang bases in each of the ten police divisions, which will amount to some 30 gang bases throughout the country.

My proposal is a two-pronged approach consisting of co-ordinated and monitored police divisional patrols supported by strategic surveillance patrols and exercises, which would require the following:

1. One hundred GPS-monitored police patrol vehicles and 90 surveillance vehicles – to be distributed among the ten divisions.

2. The setting up of 30 surveillance (preferably military) camps in close proximity to the known gang bases and relatively close to the roadway, each camp to be manned with 60 people in two shifts of 30 each, with three operational vehicles.

3. Each camp should dispatch two surveillance patrols every four hours consisting of six officers each. This means the camp will have 18 officers and a vehicle on reserve at all times. These patrols are to focus on challenging groups of men travelling in vehicles and gathered in public and private places (this may necessitate relevant legislation to be enacted which may require an amendment of the definition of loitering within a sunset clause).

I don’t believe a limited state of emergency would be necessary or beneficial, even without the imposition of a curfew or other major infringements on the constitutional rights of citizens, because it will be susceptible to being abused, as has happened in the past.

4. The ten police patrol vehicles are to be based and despatched from the divisional headquarters and manned by four officers (I suggest one from a station district within the division, one from the divisional CID and two from the divisional task force). The patrols are to be co-ordinated to cover the areas in and around the gang bases and hot-spot (crime prevalent) areas. (Details of an appropriate duty roster for this purpose can be provided upon request.)

5. The central command centre will be aware of all patrols, their duration and areas to be covered. The centre will be able to monitor the patrol vehicles’ movements and locations so that when an emergency call comes in, it would be able to redirect the closest vehicle/s to the emergency and also be able to contact the surveillance camp, if necessary, for further support.

The command centre, therefore, must be adequately staffed to ensure that each telephone line is manned in such a way that no caller will have to wait more than ten seconds for the call to be answered.

This is not robotic science nor any attempt to reinvent the wheel. These are tried and successfully tested strategies. However, it will require dedicated supervisors, such as duty inspectors and FDOs, at the divisional headquarters to ensure the patrols are despatched in a prompt and efficient manner.

That said, these supervisors should be called to account for any shortcomings as indicated by the command centre’s daily report.

Further to this, I would think that the regiment would be best suited to man the surveillance camps because these camps should be manned by approximately 2,000 highly trained and equipped personnel who, from all indications, would not be readily available from the police service in the short, medium and, probably, even long term in light of its manpower shortfall.

I appreciate the fact that only the central government can say or decide whether our military can be used in this manner. However, I feel confident that the TTPS cannot by any stretch of imagination undertake such an exercise on its own.

It is my humble view that this can be a very effective strategy in the short and medium term to immediately stem the undoubtedly out-of-control gun violence in our communities.

CLEMENT MARSHALL

retired police officer