The High Court has dismissed a claim brought by a registered nurse against the South West Regional Health Authority (SWRHA) over salary deductions made following her prolonged illness.
In dismissing Nicolia McLean-Kelly’s lawsuit on January 26, Justice Westmin James ruled that the SWRHA acted lawfully and within the terms of the employment contract.
“The deductions from the claimant’s salary arose directly from the formal reclassification of her leave as unpaid following exhaustion of her contractual entitlement.
“The claimant argues that because she was initially paid in full while hospitalised at the defendant’s institution, the subsequent recovery of salary was unlawful or unfair. I do not accept that contention,” the judge wrote.
In deciding the case, Justice James held that the SWRHA neither breached McLean-Kelly’s contract nor improperly exercised its discretion in classifying periods of her illness as leave without pay.
McLean-Kelly had sued to recover $63,482.08 deducted from her salary after the SWRHA reclassified portions of her sick leave as unpaid. She also sought damages for breach of contract, loss of gratuity amounting to $13,917, aggravated and exemplary damages, and interest.
The nurse, who has been employed at the San Fernando General Hospital since 2018, became critically ill in July 2020 after contracting mycoplasma pneumonia while on duty. She was hospitalised for several weeks, including more than three weeks in the Intensive Care Unit, during which she suffered cardiac arrests and later underwent emergency lung surgery. She also sustained an unrelated injury in July 2021.
McLean-Kelly argued that the SWRHA unlawfully reclassified her sick leave as leave without pay and made unauthorised monthly deductions from her salary without notice. She contended that the SWRHA failed to properly exercise its discretion under her contract and should have treated her absence as paid sick leave or injury leave, given the severity of her condition.
The SWRHA denied the claim, maintaining that under clause 9(a) of the employment contract, contracted employees are entitled to only 14 working days of paid sick leave per contract year, with any additional leave granted at the employer’s discretion. The SWRHA said McLean-Kelly exhausted that entitlement by late July 2020 and that subsequent payments amounted to overpayments of public funds, which it was legally obliged to recover.
Justice James held that the contract clearly limited paid sick leave to 14 days and gave the employer a broad discretion to determine whether any extended sick leave should be paid. He found that this discretion was lawfully exercised in accordance with established HR policies applicable to contract employees, which “normally” provide for extended sick leave without pay.
He rejected the claimant’s argument that internal HR guidelines unlawfully overrode her contract, noting that the contract expressly required employees to comply with applicable policies and procedures. The judge also found it implausible that the claimant, as a senior nurse in a highly regulated institution, was unaware of the existence of such policies.
In his ruling, Justice James concluded that the SWRHA’s decision was rational, non-arbitrary, and consistent with how other contract employees are treated. He ruled that the SWRHA was entitled to distinguish between contract and permanent staff and that the seriousness of McLean-Kelly’s illness, while justifying extended leave, did not compel the payment of salary beyond her contractual entitlement.
On the issue of deductions, he found that the overpayments arose because medical certificates could only be issued at the end of hospitalisation and that HR was therefore unable to reclassify the leave sooner. Once the overpayments were identified, the authority was legally bound under the Exchequer and Audit Act to recover the funds.
In dismissing the claim in its entirety, the judge ordered McLean-Kelly to pay the SWRHA’s prescribed costs of $19,479.80, excluding VAT. A 90-day stay of execution was granted.
McLean-Kelly was represented by Nigel Transcoso and Shivanna Kitwaroo, while the SWRHA was represented by Michael Rooplal and Marissa Ciara Ramsoondar.
The Government has signalled its intention to introduce legislation to hold parents legally accountable when their children are in conflict with the law, particularly in relation to bullying, violence and related misconduct affecting schools and communities.
In an emerging climate where youth violence and bullying carry human and social costs, a carefully designed “parental accountability” law can be a practical tool to reduce reoffending, strengthen early intervention, and ensure families engage with the systems meant to help children before harm escalates.
Currently, under the Children Act, parents have the option to bring their child before the court to deem them a Child In Need of Supervision (CHINS), thus allowing the court to have oversight of the child’s care and everyday well-being. However, a niche sector of children has found itself at the forefront of our headlines in terms of youth offenders and bullying in schools.
Why legislate?
A central weakness in youth offending responses is that the system frequently engages the child but struggles to secure consistent parental participation, especially where patterns of violence or repeated offending begin. A parental accountability framework is designed to close that gap by creating a legal lever to require attendance at interventions and compliance with reasonable behavioural plans, rather than relying solely on voluntary cooperation.
Properly drafted, the legislation can promote early intervention, triggering a court-ordered programme to offer early support, reduce reoffending, improve the home environment and supervision and importantly, strengthen school safety.
The government’s proposal can be framed as a public safety mechanism and child protection measure, not to be viewed as a criminalisation tool. When the objective is preventing future harm, the law can be calibrated to support families while still demanding accountability.
What other jurisdictions do
In England & Wales, there is the implementation of “Parenting Orders,” which focuses on behaviour change where courts may impose an order requiring a parent to attend counselling/guidance sessions and comply with additional requirements aimed at controlling or improving the child’s behaviour (for example, ensuring school attendance).
This model is somewhat implemented in TT, where the Children Court grants orders implementing counselling, curfews, and parenting classes. No legislation in Trinidad thus far imposes a fine or penalty.
Across the United States, many states have some form of parental responsibility laws, which can be civil in nature, where parents pay for damages caused by a child or criminal in nature, where parents face penalties for failure to supervise in specific circumstances. The US Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) describes these laws as aiming to involve parents by holding them liable in different ways for delinquent behaviour.
TT can borrow civil-style measures such as orders, mandated programmes, and limited penalties, where fines exist, and apply caps. As with every offence, exceptions can be considered to include a “reasonable steps” defence, so parents are not punished where they genuinely tried to supervise and seek help.
If TT is to legislate in this space, the design details will determine whether it reduces youth offending or simply adds controversy. A strong approach can include a “support first, sanctions last” approach, where it begins with mandatory parenting sessions, counselling, school attendance plans and case management. Sanctions (fines or community-based penalties) can be a last resort for persistent non-compliance.
The government is equipped to bring this type of legislation into place, having introduced the suite of children’s legislation during its last tenure. The intended law should not be activated for minor misbehaviour but should apply where a child can be and has been charged/convicted of specified offences, or there is repeated serious misconduct.
Parents should not be punished where they can show they took reasonable steps, such as seeking help, co-operating with school/authorities, attending programmes, and trying to supervise. This protects parents who sometimes have to deal with a child’s mental health needs.
Why implementation is justified
TT has an opportunity to craft a framework that reflects a simple truth: youth offending is often the end-stage of problems which began earlier (poor supervision, family stress, unmet mental health needs, and community violence exposure). A parental accountability law can give the state a mechanism to compel engagement before a child’s pathway hardens into repeated offending.
It is about structured responsibility and early intervention. When paired with real services and sensible safeguards, such a law can protect victims, support families, and improve outcomes for children who are at risk of cycling deeper into the justice system.
THE Privy Council has upheld a Court of Appeal ruling that found an obstetrician negligent for failing to ensure foetal heart rate monitoring during a delayed emergency caesarean section that led to catastrophic brain injuries at birth.
The case arose from a claim brought by Nicole Singh, mother of Christopher Singh, over injuries Christopher suffered during delivery by emergency caesarean section at St Augustine Private Hospital. Christopher was born at 11.13 am on September 9, 2012, after prolonged oxygen deprivation and was later diagnosed with severe cerebral palsy, leaving him unable to walk, talk, sit, or stand independently. He continues to suffer from severe physical impairment and is non-verbal.
At trial, Justice Betsy Ann Lambert Peterson found the hospital negligent for systemic failures that caused delays in carrying out the caesarean section, including late contact with an anaesthetist and the absence of a theatre assistant. Those delays were found to have caused Christopher’s injuries. The hospital’s appeal was dismissed, and liability against it was not in dispute before the Privy Council.
The trial judge, however, dismissed the claim against Dr Prakashbhan Persad, a consultant at the hospital, holding that his conduct met the required standard of care. In July 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned that finding, concluding that Dr Persad bore responsibility for failing to ensure monitoring of the foetal heart rate during the roughly 50 minutes Mrs Singh waited in the operating theatre before delivery. The Appeal Court held that, without such monitoring, Dr Persad and the anaesthetist were unaware that the foetus was in distress and did not act with appropriate urgency.
In a detailed judgment on January 19, the Privy Council agreed with the Court of Appeal that Persad’s role was “overarching and supervisory” once an emergency caesarean section was contemplated. The judgment noted that while midwives ordinarily carry out foetal heart rate monitoring, it was Dr Persad’s responsibility to ensure he had the information necessary to assess the foetus’s condition and direct the team accordingly.
“In the board’s judgment, the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Dr Persad was negligent in failing to ensure that he kept himself and his team aware of the FHR (foetal heart rate), which would have indicated the distressed condition of the foetus during the crucial period of the second stage of labour in the operating theatre.
“Although no doubt it is the midwives who would actually have carried out the FHR monitoring in the operating theatre, it was Dr Persad’s responsibility to ensure that he had the information he needed to be able to assess the condition of the foetus.
“He should have been aware throughout of whether or not the foetus was in distress so that he could act accordingly. It is not a matter of holding him responsible for the failings of the midwives or of the hospital.
“If Dr Persad had asked the midwives in the operating theatre to start measuring Christopher’s heart rate whilst everyone was waiting for the theatre assistant to arrive or whilst Dr Gangadhararao Narra (anaesthetist) was attempting to insert the spinal anaesthetic needle, they could and would have done so.
“That would have made apparent the distress Christopher was experiencing in utero, the C-section could have been carried out immediately, and Christopher would not have suffered such catastrophic injuries.
“The Court of Appeal were right to say that once a surgical process was contemplated, only the surgeon could be in charge of managing the process from that point.
This fundamental point was obscured by the focus at the trial and in the judgment on the output, or lack of it, of the CTG machine which had monitored the FHR whilst Mrs Singh was on the maternity ward.
“A further point that may have distracted attention from what should have been the main issue was the debate over the difference in the role of the consultant obstetrician in a private hospital compared with a consultant obstetrician in a public hospital.
“There may certainly be differences between the position in the public and private health sector as regards the vicarious liability of the hospital for the failures of the consultants it employs. But there has been no suggestion that it is any less important in a private hospital than in a public hospital for the obstetrician to ensure that he or she has the information needed to make the correct decisions as to how to proceed when it becomes clear that a natural birth is not possible. “The Board is firmly of the view that the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Dr Persad was negligent in failing to ensure that he and Dr Narra were aware of the baby’s condition during the 50 minutes when Mrs Singh was in the operating theatre.”
In its judgment, delivered by current Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh, with Justices Nolan Bereaux and Maria Wilson concurring, the Court of Appeal held that Persad’s role “was overarching and supervisory of the entire process.”
“He was the team leader. A midwife cannot have responsibility in a surgical procedure.”
Boodoosingh wrote, “Dr Persad may not have been responsible for all of the delay, but he failed to be proactive and failed to manage the consequences of the delay as was his responsibility…
“Neither the hospital nor Dr Persad treated this delivery with the urgency required, and they are therefore, on the judge’s findings of fact, both liable in negligence.
In its judgment, delivered by Lady Vivien Rose, the Privy Council rejected arguments that the allegation was unfairly pleaded or not properly put to Dr Persad at trial, finding that the pleadings, expert evidence and cross-examination clearly raised the issue of inadequate monitoring in the operating theatre. It also accepted evidence that foetal heart rate monitoring could have been performed manually and would likely have revealed distress, prompting faster delivery.
Although dismissing his appeal, the London-based court agreed with Dr Persad on limited points, holding that he was not negligent merely for the overall time between the decision to perform a caesarean section and delivery in the absence of known foetal distress, nor for briefly leaving the operating theatre during the administration of anaesthesia.
“In so far as this is intended to be a finding of negligence based merely on his absence separate from the wider point about delay, the Board agrees with Dr Persad that there is no basis for concluding either that a consultant is expected to be in the operating theatre for the whole period prior to the start of surgery or that Dr Persad’s absence had any effect on the progress of events.”
Also presiding over the appeal at the Privy Council were Lords Lloyd-Jones, Briggs, Leggatt and Richards. Attorneys Renald Davidson and Terrance Neale represented Dr Persad at the Privy Council.
Nicole Singh was represented by Michael Powers, KC and Ravi Heffes-Doon, instructed by Neela Ramsundar. Ian Benjamin, SC, Vanessa Gopaul and Elena Araujo represented the hospital as an intervener.
A New Grant man has been committed to three days in prison for willfully disobeying a court order to pay damages arising from a 2012 assault and battery claim, despite having the means to do so. Justice Frank Seepersad made the order against Groodial Badal on January 15.
While maintaining that contempt orders must never be used oppressively to punish poverty, he acknowledged that they were justified where a party deliberately refuses to comply with a lawful order. He ruled that Badal’s conduct amounted to willful disobedience and committed him to three days’ simple imprisonment, refusing an application for a stay.
“The dispensation of justice at times necessitates an empathetic approach to the application of the rule of law,” Seepersad said. “However, where there has been willful disobedience and/or an unjustified refusal to obey the terms of a court order despite having the means to do so, the court must protect and preserve its authority and dispassionately apply the full force of the law.”
Addressing Badal directly, the judge said, “You are in contempt for your failure to make any payment. This does not absolve you of payment of the balance owed. I hope it gives you time to reflect. Your obligations will be met as soon as you are released from custody.”
The court found that evidence showed Badal had multiple streams of income and failed to provide any proof that he was unable to pay any portion of the judgment debt. Seepersad described Badal’s conduct as “nonchalance” and “pervicacious disobedience.”
“Compliance with court orders is not optional. It is mandatory. It is regrettable that in this society disregard for the law appears to be entrenched, and far too often, citizens only comply with legal obligations under the threat of severe sanction.
“Sadly, the ‘big stick over your head syndrome’ seems to be engraved and entrenched into the social fabric, and only its presence and use catalyses compliance,” the judge said.
In sending a warning, he added, “One’s deliberate unlawful actions does attract consequences and persons must be held to account when they are guilty of wrongdoing or volitionally defy orders of the court.”
Balkaran, also of New Grant, sought the committal order after Badal failed to comply with a consent order dated April 20, 2016. The original claim, filed in June 2012, arose out of an assault and battery matter. Judgment in default was entered in April 2014 after Badal failed to file an appearance or defence, though it was later set aside and the defence filed. The matter was ultimately compromised by consent.
Under the consent order, Badal agreed to pay $70,000, inclusive of interest and costs, with a lump-sum payment due in May 2016 and the remaining balance to be paid in monthly installments of $1,500 starting June 30, 2016. Court records showed that since June 2016, Badal paid $22,000 by January 2020 and a further $1,500 in May 2024.
Statutory interest at five percent continued to accrue and that, as of February 17, 2025, the total sum due and owing stood at $68,523.10. Balkaran’s application said Badal owned his home in New Grant and operated a roti shop and a burger cart, demonstrating an ability to pay while refusing to do so.
Seepersad noted that the matter had been before the court for a significant period and that every opportunity had been afforded to Badal to satisfy his obligations, even in part.
The imprisonment order takes immediate effect, though the outstanding debt remains payable in full. Attorney Ravi Bunsee represented Balkaran while Mustapha Khan represented Badal, who said he paid a $15,000 lump sum and was able to pay $7,000 by January 32, 2019. He said he was always willing to pay the $1,500, even asking for banking information, but Balkaran refused. He said his financial situation worsened after the pandemic and his monthly expenses are more than his income. He also claimed he remained unemployed since covid19 and started receiving NIS payments in 2021. His defence maintained that Balkaran had not established that he had the means to pay the judgment but that he was willing to continue paying monthly installments of $1,000 to satisfy the debt.
WHEN ACTIVIST Anthony Dopson last year asked the judiciary to give statistics about its backlog, there was not even a system in place that would allow a speedy answer. Instead, according to details supplied by court administrators last year, individual judges were tasked with reviewing their cases and tabulating totals; registrars had to be instructed to count hundreds of orders. Moving forward, the judiciary said it would be “reviewing and strengthening the existing system for the collection of relevant data.”
This is the context of Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh’s appointment of five new judicial officers on January 13. The CJ’s apology last year for the long wait times citizens have to endure was welcomed and sent the right signal. But with the appointments of Trevor Jones, Raymond Roberts, Maria Busby Earle-Caddle, Josefina Baptiste Mohammed and Sydelle Johnson to the bench, Boodoosingh has followed his words with actions. He tasked these officials with serving the public by combating delays. We hope this is a preview of the rest of the new CJ’s tenure.
Speaking with the media at President’s House, St Ann’s, moments after being sworn in, Justice Jones noted he first joined the judiciary to help tackle the backlog. He correctly noted that better case management, streamlined procedures and expansion of the bench will all impact how long it takes rulings to be handed down.
But the nature of the problem is complex. Clogged are the civil division, the criminal division and the family and children division. Rulings are outstanding; but in some cases indictments have not even been filed. The staff shortage issues at the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions are well known. But one reason indictments seemed to have trickled in recent years is the fact that hundreds, if not thousands, of matters have been pending for over ten years. Compounding the delay has also been the elevation of criminal judges to the Court of Appeal without replacements at the trial level. This week’s fresh appointments may help address such gaps.
Of course, simply adding new staff is not a panacea for the judiciary’s problems.
Government has taken some of the load off from judicial officers by giving JPs heightened warrant powers. But other reforms are needed too.
As officials already acknowledge, the prison system needs to be overhauled to address recidivism. Court infrastructure needs to be upgraded. And more priority should be placed on addressing serious crime, not filling dockets with trivial matters. Antiquated rules and procedures, too, need to go. For instance, while Boodoosingh has promised a return to in-person courts, there’s no reason why proceedings cannot be hybrid in the interests of efficiency. The CJ has a lot to tackle. But he’s made a promising start.
THE High Court has ruled that The Surgical Specialist Centre Ltd wrongfully dismissed its former managing director, Elizabeth Kelly, but also ordered her to repay more than $215,000 to the company for unauthorised payments.
In a recent judgment delivered by Justice Jacqueline Wilson, the court found that while Kelly must reimburse the company for sums she conceded were improperly taken from its accounts, the centre failed to prove that she breached her fiduciary duties as a director, rendering her dismissal unjustified.
The claim arose after the breakdown of the personal and business relationship between Kelly and Dr Alan de Freitas, a director and shareholder of the medical facility. The Surgical Specialist Centre alleged Kelly misappropriated company funds, made unauthorised payments and breached her fiduciary obligations, leading to her termination in November 2022. Kelly accepted responsibility for several disputed transactions but counterclaimed that her dismissal was wrongful and sought damages.
The court heard that the company was incorporated in June 2016, with de Freitas and Kelly as equal shareholders and directors, and began operations in 2018 after acquiring a private medical business. Its operations were financed through multiple bank loans, including a major loan from an investment company, which governed salary arrangements and certain financial controls.
Justice Wilson found that the company’s financial arrangements, particularly concerning the payment of personal and household expenses from company accounts, were informal, loosely defined and applied inconsistently to both principals.
As a result, the court concluded that the claimant failed to establish a breach of fiduciary duty by Kelly and that the loss of trust cited by the company did not justify her summary dismissal.
“Both parties have admitted to using company funds for personal expenses,” the judge said, noting that the lack of clarity and consistency in the financial arrangements had to be resolved in Kelly’s favour.
“There was no written contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant, and the question whether there was a breach of contract, for which the defendant is entitled to damages, must be determined on the facts of the case,” the judge said.
She added, “In the circumstances and having regard to the undefined scope of the personal expenses for which the claimant was liable, the overall flexibility in the financial arrangements and the inconsistency in their application, I have concluded that the claimant has failed to establish that the defendant has acted in breach of her fiduciary duty.
“The lack of clarity in the claimant’s financial arrangements or consistency in their application must be resolved in the defendant’s favour.
“Her dismissal was, therefore, unjustified, and she is entitled to damages for breach of contract.”
On damages, the judge determined that Kelly, who earned a monthly salary of $20,000, was entitled to six months’ notice, awarding her $120,000 for wrongful dismissal. That amount is to be deducted from the $215,724.05 she agreed to repay to the company.
The court ordered Kelly to pay the company $215,724.05 and prescribed costs of $41,358. The Surgical Specialist Centre was also ordered to pay Kelly $120,000 in damages and prescribed costs of $27,000 on her counterclaim.
Naline Sharma and Andrea Goddard represented Surgical Specialist Ltd while Jean Louis Kelly and Natalie King represented Kelly.
A High Court judge has dismissed a constitutional claim brought by a former Defence Force soldier, ruling that her 2014 discharge on the grounds of “completion of engagement” was lawful, reasonable and did not breach her constitutional right to protection of the law.
In a written judgment delivered by Justice Joan Charles, the court found that the Defence Force acted within its statutory powers under the Defence Act when it discharged Jenna Jackson after her first term of service and declined to re-engage her, despite her claims of unfairness, illegality and a denial of natural justice.
Jackson, represented by attorney Ronald Simon, had challenged her discharge from the Defence Force on August 4, 2014, arguing that it was premature, irrational and unconstitutional. She sought declarations that the decision infringed her rights under Section 4(b) of the Constitution, reinstatement to the Defence Force, compensation for lost earnings and benefits, and damages.
The state, represented by attorneys Michelle Benjamin and Kristyn Lewis, instructed by Ronnelle Hinds and Victoria Armorer, opposed the claim.
In her judgment, Justice Charles held that re-engagement in the Defence Force is discretionary and not automatic. She said Jackson had no legitimate expectation of re-engagement and that the competent military authority was entitled to end her service upon completion of her engagement.
The judge reviewed evidence showing that Jackson, who enlisted in April 2006, had extended periods of sick leave and medical restrictions related to polycystic ovaries, a back injury and complications following childbirth. These restrictions, the court noted, prevented her from performing core military duties such as prolonged standing, physical training and night duty.
Justice Charles concluded that the Defence Force’s decision was neither irrational nor an improper exercise of discretion. “It is not for this court to substitute its own decision for that of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force,” she said, recognising the military’s responsibility to manage operational effectiveness and fitness standards.
“I bear in mind that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is a military organisation charged with the responsibility of managing its strength, troop assignments, and discipline in furtherance of its duty to protect the nation,” the judge said.
While acknowledging that the Defence Force did not issue a discharge certificate to Jackson at the time of her discharge, the judge found that she had access to alternative remedies, including a petition to the Defence Council and judicial review proceedings, and therefore failed to meet the high threshold required to establish a constitutional breach.
The court also rejected Jackson’s claim for damages, finding no infringement of her constitutional rights. Although Justice Charles observed that the Defence Force could have chosen to discharge Jackson on medical grounds, she held that its decision to rely on “completion of engagement” was lawful.
Jackson’s claim was dismissed, and in exercising her discretion on costs, Justice Charles ordered that each party bear its own legal costs.
THE Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the Chief of Defence Staff challenging a High Court decision that allowed a former soldier to pursue judicial review over the military’s refusal to roster him for duty after his discharge was ruled unlawful.
In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice of Appeal Nolan Bereaux, with Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh, the court held that the High Court judge was not “plainly wrong” to grant permission for judicial review, clearing the way for Devon Edwards’ claim to proceed.
The appellant, the Chief of Defence Staff, sought to overturn an order made by Justice Joan Charles on June 24, 2024, which refused to set aside leave granted to Edwards to challenge the defence force’s decision not to re-engage and roster him following a prior court ruling that declared his discharge illegal.
Edwards, a soldier in the defence force, was discharged in May 2014 under a “zero tolerance” policy after he was charged with criminal offences. In a separate constitutional action decided in June 2020, then-Justice James Aboud ruled that the policy, as applied to Edwards, was unlawful, ultra vires the Defence Force Act and in breach of several of his constitutional rights. Aboud awarded Edwards $15,000 in damages but made no order for reinstatement.
After the Chief of Defence Staff declined, by letter dated September 22, 2020, to roster Edwards for duty, Edwards sought judicial review to challenge that refusal. The defence chief argued that Edwards had failed to disclose material facts, had abused the court process and was barred because reinstatement had been considered and rejected in the earlier case.
In dismissing the appeal, Bereaux said the threshold for granting leave for judicial review is low and that such decisions should be overturned only sparingly. He found that Justice Charles was entitled to conclude that Edwards had an arguable case and had not breached his duty of candour.
“The issue of reinstatement was not sought as a substantive remedy nor finally determined” in the earlier constitutional proceedings, Bereaux said, adding that the discussion of reinstatement before Aboud arose only in the context of assessing damages.
The court also rejected claims of delay, noting that Edwards’ cause of action arose only after the defence chief formally refused to roster him following the 2020 ruling.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the Chief of Defence Staff was ordered to pay Edwards’ costs, to be assessed by the registrar if not agreed.
A High Court judge has ordered the state to pay more than $223,000 in damages, interest and costs to a sporting apparel wholesaler who was unlawfully detained and maliciously prosecuted by police officers during a traffic stop in 2018.
In a recent judgment, Justice Devindra Rampersad ruled that the claimant, who asked that his name not be revealed because of the prevailing crime situation, was falsely imprisoned and subjected to malicious prosecution after being stopped, detained and charged by officers of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, during a traffic exercise on the Churchill Roosevelt Highway on June 23, 2018.
He was represented at trial by attorney Joel Roper. In his order, Justice Rampersad awarded the claimant $50,000 in damages for false imprisonment, inclusive of aggravated damages, and $70,000 for malicious prosecution. An additional $25,000 was awarded as special damages.
The court also granted interest on the awards. Justice Rampersad declined to award exemplary damages, stating that no further damages were warranted under that head. The defendant was also ordered to pay the claimant’s prescribed legal costs, quantified at $34,410.41.
According to the statement of case, the claimant, a wholesaler and retailer of sporting apparel, was stopped by police shortly after 10.30 am while driving to make business deliveries and photograph a wedding. He was initially ticketed for speeding and tinted windows before being stopped again minutes later, forcibly removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, searched and taken to the Cumuto Police Station.
His claim contended he was detained for approximately eight hours without being informed of the reasons for his arrest or advised of his constitutional rights, including access to an attorney or a telephone call. He was later charged with exceeding the speed limit, driving with a heavily tinted window, and using insulting language. A magistrate subsequently dismissed the charge of using insulting language.
THE JUDICIARY has released detailed information on outstanding judgments and decisions of High Court and Court of Appeal judicial officers in response to a freedom of information request from a transparency advocate in November.
On November 25, attorneys for Anthony Dopson, a civic activist and former Oilfields Workers’ Trade Union branch secretary, demanded the release of detailed records on long-standing court judgments.
The FOIA request, sent by Freedom Law Chambers, was addressed to Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh.
The firm, led by Anand Ramlogan, SC, argued that delays eroded trust in the Judiciary and violated the constitutional promise of timely justice. The request gave the Chief Justice until December 25 to issue a decision.
A letter accompanying the request noted a national concern about judicial backlogs, questioning whether judicial resources are being efficiently managed.
“Given that the Judiciary is constitutionally mandated to uphold the rule of law and ensure access to justice, prolonged delays undermine its constitutional role and impair public confidence in this critical institution. These matters are plainly of national concern.
“They affect citizens’ constitutional right of access to justice, the efficiency of a core branch of the State, and the credibility of the judicial system,” attorney Aasha Ramlal wrote.
The FOIA request sought a list of all matters in which High Court judges, masters, registrars and Court of Appeal judges have reserved judgments for more than six months; all matters where decisions on applications or costs have remained outstanding beyond three months; all statements of costs filed but unassessed after one year, with the assigned registrar identified; all pending appeals where written reasons remain outstanding more than six months after the notice of appeal; the number of decisions of each High Court judge that have been reversed by the Court of Appeal over the past five years.
CJ COMMITTED TO TRANSPARENCY
In its response, the Judiciary’s disclosure covered judges of the Court of Appeal, the High Court, masters, and registrars, providing data as of November 25.
It also provided a list of reserved judgments outstanding for over six months; outstanding decisions on costs; statements of costs filed but not yet assessed; outstanding reasons for appeals over six months; and appeals filed where High Court decisions were overturned by the Court of Appeal in the past five years.
In the statement, the Office of the Chief Justice emphasised the Judiciary’s commitment to public accountability and transparency.
It said the information was compiled primarily from judicial officers’ own reporting, with registrars reviewing hundreds of Court of Appeal orders dating back to 2020. It also said the information was being simultaneously disclosed to the media “in acknowledgement of its duties of accountability to the public and transparency in its operations.”
The statement added, “The information we have provided is based largely on the reporting of the judicial officers themselves. The Judiciary understands the importance of maintaining accurate records and tracking the progress of cases in which decisions are pending, and we will continue to update our records as new monitoring systems are implemented.”
The Judiciary noted that while there are no statutory timelines for the delivery of judgments in Trinidad and Tobago, six months is generally considered a reasonable benchmark. Oral judgments are often delivered within this period, although decisions from higher courts, including the Privy Council, can take longer.
Highlighting the principles guiding judicial conduct, the statement cited the Statements of Principles and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, which instruct judges to dispose of court business “efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.” It noted that factors such as case complexity, workload, or health issues can affect timelines.
“The Judiciary recognises that one of its core functions is to ensure that judgments and decisions are provided ‘with reasonable promptness’ and that adequate reasons are given in the event of an appeal.
“Most judicial officers monitor their performance to ensure compliance with their obligations.
“Most judicial officers also work diligently, striving to hear and dispose of cases fairly and within a reasonable time. At times, however, judicial officers, like everyone else, undergo health and other challenges which impact their efficiency.”
To support the timely delivery of judgments, the Judiciary outlined ongoing initiatives to facilitate general compliance. These include: continued training on oral and written judgments; monitoring judicial performance by officers and the Office of the Chief Justice; mentoring and advising newer judicial officers; strengthening systems for tracking judicial performance; public reporting on judicial activity; and encouraging timely submissions from attorneys to facilitate prompt decisions.
Judiciary apologises
The statement acknowledged that some court users have experienced delays and offered a sincere apology, committing to delivering outstanding judgments as quickly as possible.
“We acknowledge that some court users have had to wait a long time for judgments and decisions to be given.
“For this, the Judiciary sincerely apologises. We commit to doing all that is humanly possible to ensure that these outstanding judgments will be delivered in the shortest possible time. We will also work diligently to deliver reserved judgments and decisions within a reasonable time as we move forward.
“We ask for the understanding of the public as we strive to fulfil our mandate within the existing constraints of resources.” The Judiciary said the disclosure reflected its dedication to ensuring timely justice.
“It is also a recognition of our duty to be accountable to the public to enhance trust and confidence in the judicial system.”
In the letter, Dopson’s attorneys noted, “The Judiciary is one of the three constitutional branches of government. Its operations must be transparent to ensure public confidence. Delayed judgments, particularly those delayed beyond the accepted six-month standard, affect the credibility of the institution.
The Hall of Justice, Port of Spain. – File photo
“Disclosure will allow the public to understand the extent of systemic delays and whether corrective measures are needed. Judicial officers, while constitutionally independent, are still accountable to the public for the performance of their duties. Timely judgment delivery is a core judicial responsibility. Transparency in this regard facilitates informed discourse on judicial efficiency, resource allocation, and administrative reform,” the letter said.
It also stated that Dopson intended to publish any information received “so that members of the public, attorneys and litigants can identify whether cases have been omitted and press for accuracy.
“This way, judges can be assisted by litigants and attorneys whose matters were inadvertently omitted to ensure that they have a complete list of outstanding judgments,” the letter said.
What the records show
The Judiciary disclosed detailed records showing which judges and masters have cleared long-outstanding decisions and which matters remain pending across the High Court, Family and Children Division and Court of Appeal.
In the High Court’s civil division, several judicial officers reported having no decisions reserved for more than six months. Those in full compliance include Justices Carol Gobin, Frank Seepersad and Margaret Mohammed, along with Masters Sherlanne Pierre, Coreen Findley, Rishma Ramrattan, Wrenerson Lochan and Antoinette Alleyne.
Records also show a list of outstanding civil matters before other judges, involving civil trials, interim applications and constitutional cases. Some date back several years, with reasons cited including delayed submissions, complex legal issues, transcript preparation and intervening circumstances such as the death of court staff or litigants. Delivery dates for many of these rulings are scheduled between December and mid-2026.
Judges with outstanding civil matters include Justices Joan Charles, Devindra Rampersad, Robin Mohammed, Nadia Kangaloo, Marcia Ayers-Caesar, Kevin Ramcharan, Avason Quinlan-Williams, Jacqueline Wilson, Karen Reid, Christopher Sieuchand, Westmin James and Marissa Robertson. In some cases, judgments have been drafted and await formal delivery, while in others oral decisions were given but written reasons remain pending.
In the criminal division, 13 judges reported no outstanding decisions or judgments, including Justices Devan Rampersad, Hayden St. Clair-Douglas, Kathy Ann Waterman Latchoo, Lisa Ramsumair-Hinds, Gail Gonzales, Nalini Singh, George Busby, Mauriceia Joseph, Gillian Scotland, Sherene Murray-Bailey and Tricia Hudlin-Cooper, as well as acting judges Maria Busby-Earle-Caddle and Trevor Jones.
Several masters in the criminal division also reported full compliance. A small number of matters involving reasons pending appeal remain under the supervision of Master Sarah De Silva.
Most cases cleared in Family & Children Division
The Judiciary’s update on the Family and Children Division shows that a significant number of judges and masters have cleared all matters reserved for more than six months before Nov. 25, 2025.
Family Court judges with no outstanding matters include Justices Sharon Gibson, Halcyon Yorke-Young and Linda Khan. Numerous family court masters and children court judges and masters also reported no pending decisions.
Outstanding matters were identified for a limited number of judges. Justice Joseph Tam, a temporary judge, reported several reserved decisions, some dating back years. Justice Betsy Ann Lambert-Peterson reported 19 outstanding decisions, along with pending costs rulings and appeal reasons, some originating from the Civil Division. Other judges reported one or two pending matters, most with delivery dates set between December 2025 and January 2026. The Judiciary also released an updated schedule of reserved judgments before the Court of Appeal that have been outstanding for six months or more, listing more than 60 matters across civil, criminal, family, magisterial and procedural appeals.
Some civil appeals date back to 2013, with several high-profile cases involving the Attorney General, state agencies, media houses, trade unions and former public officials. While a number of judgments were delivered in December 2025 or are scheduled for early 2026, dozens remain pending, including criminal and AJIPA appeals reserved between mid-2024 and April 2025.
Data cataloguing hundreds of High Court and tribunal decisions that were set aside, varied or remitted by the Court of Appeal between 2012 and 2025, were provided. The cases span constitutional, commercial, labour, immigration, family and public law matters, with many remitted for rehearing or reconsideration.
A 59-YEAR-OLD Moruga man appeared before a High Court Master on Christmas Eve, charged with the manslaughter of his relative Brian Figaro.
Servulus Figaro, also of Moruga, stood before Master Gray in the South Criminal Court “D” on December 24. He was not called on to enter a plea as the matter was adjourned to January 27.
According to reports, Brian Figaro was involved in a heated argument with a relative on December 8. During the altercation, Figaro was allegedly struck several times with a baton, sustaining serious injuries to his head and abdomen.
Three days later, on December 11, Figaro collapsed at his home. He was rushed to the Princes Town District Health Facility, where he was pronounced dead.
Following advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on December 23, Servulus Figaro was arrested and charged.
In a separate incident a 26-year-old Petit Bourg man has been remanded into custody after appearing in court charged with the murder of Mickel Browne.
Dylan Collette of Jackson Street, appeared before Master Indira Chinebas on December 24. In addition to murder, Collette faces charges of possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition and common assault.
The charges stem from an incident on December 5, when 31-year-old Browne of Champ Fleurs, was at a bar in San Juan lining with a group of people. Reports say a gunman approached the group, pointed a weapon at Browne and fired several times before fleeing the scene.
Browne was taken to hospital but later succumbed to his injuries. Collette reportedly surrendered to officers at the Homicide Bureau of Investigations (HBI) Region II on December 19. He is expected to return to court on January 7.
A PRINCES TOWN couple who killed the woman’s previous abusive boyfriend have been sentenced to a total of 29 years for their roles in the businessman’s murder.
Dwayne Baldeo and Renee Mohammed were sentenced by Justice Mauricia Joseph-Patrick in the San Fernando High Court for the October 28, 2020, murder of Christopher Hosein.
Hosein, 45, a businessman, who resigned from the Fire Service about ten years ago, lived at St James Street in Princes Town. There, he ran his business, Expert Fire and Safety Ltd. A farmer found his burnt body near his burnt Kia Sorento in a gravel road off the M1 Tasker Road in the Ste Madeleine police district. A yellow rope was tied around Hosein’s neck, his hands were bound, and his eyes were covered with duct tape.
Police investigations quickly focused on Baldeo and Mohammed after CCTV footage, witness accounts, and forensic evidence linked them to Hosein’s apartment. A white Toyota Fielder wagon driven by Baldeo was intercepted later that day, and items belonging to the deceased were recovered. A post-mortem examination determined that Hosein died from a combination of asphyxia, inhalation of soot, burns, and blunt force trauma to the head.
Baldeo and Mohammed both pleaded guilty to murder on the basis of felony murder under a plea agreement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The agreement followed their indictment on June 18, 2024, for Hosein’s murder of Hosein. In sentencing the two, Justice Joseph-Patrick adopted a starting point of 33 years’ imprisonment for both. Baldeo benefited from a downward adjustment of three years for his conduct while incarcerated. A further one-third reduction was applied for his guilty plea, amounting to ten years. After also taking into account time already spent on remand of almost five years, Joseph-Patrick imposed a final sentence of a little over 15 years’ imprisonment.
Baldeo was represented by Rajiv Persad, SC, and Ajesh Summesar.
Dwayne Baldeo. – Photo courtesy TTPS
Mohammed’s starting point was also reduced by three years for remorse and positive conduct in prison. An additional one-year reduction was granted in light of her background, personal history, and immaturity at the time of the offence. She was 23 at the time. A further one-third reduction for her guilty plea, amounting to nine years and eight months,was applied. After credit for time spent in custody, Mohammed received a final sentence of slightly over 14 years’ imprisonment.
She was represented by attorneys Michelle Ali and Kameika Peters of the Public Defenders’ Department.
In an affidavit placed before the court, Mohammed described a deeply troubled personal history, including childhood sexual abuse and a turbulent, on-and-off relationship with Hosein. She said aspects of that relationship caused past trauma to resurface and contributed to her emotional state at the time.
Mohammed admitted she and Baldeo were also in a tumultuous relationship. He helped her and her mother financially and with errands. She said it was never her intuition to lead him on, but she now realises she was wrong for entertaining his advances. She detailed incidents in which she alleged he had previously assaulted her, leading to serious injuries and extended hospitalisation.
According to Mohammed, after her release from hospital she moved in with Hosein due to her physical condition and financial dependence. She said she also suffered abuse by Hosein while recovering from her injuries.
She claimed that she later disclosed her experiences to Baldeo, who offered to “rough up” Hosein. She admitted accepting that offer and helping to plan the encounter, but maintained that she did not intend or expect Hosein to die.
“I understand that I was a party in the act that caused the deceased to die,” Mohammed stated, “but I had no intention or knowledge that he was going to die.”
She described the past five years in custody as “a nightmare” and expressed remorse for her actions.
THREE decades after he and another man murdered two women in Westmoorings, convicted killer Chuck Attin has had 22 years, nine months and 15 days tacked on to his sentence for the rape of one of the women’s maids.
The High Court sentenced Attin, also known as Clint Pierre, to more than 22 years in prison for rape after he pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences dating back to 1994, when he murdered Candace Scott, 23, and Karen Sa Gomes, 31.
Justice Kathy Ann Waterman-Latchoo imposed a sentence of 26 years and eight months’ imprisonment with hard labour on the rape charge, with credit given for three years, ten months, and five days already served. This results in a remaining sentence of 22 years, nine months and 25 days.
Attin also received sentences of one year and four months each for serious indecency and buggery. However, both of those sentences were fully extinguished after the court credited him with time already served. The sentences took effect from December 12.
Attin is already serving time, at the court’s pleasure, for Scott and Sa Gomes’s murders, as he was one of the youngest murderers convicted, at just 15, in 1997.
Attin, formerly of Nile Street, Cocorite, was initially sentenced by Justice Lionel Jones to be detained at the State’s pleasure, but this was later challenged in a constitutional motion, and the law was changed so that child murderers, who cannot face the death penalty because of their age, would be detained at the court’s pleasure, with periodic reviews.
In 2004, then Justice Herbert Volney sentenced Attin to a minimum of 25 years, after which he would return to court for a review of his sentence.
Volney’s ruling was partly upheld by the Court of Appeal, which ruled the 25-year punitive element of the sentence was not excessive, having regard to the brutality of the case, but that the sentence should come up for review before expiration of the term.
Attin’s last review was in March 2023, when High Court judge Hayden St Clair-Douglas held that his detention should continue.
In October, Attin pleaded guilty to the rape, serious indecency and buggery charges and was sentenced by Justice Waterman-Latchoo, after he accepted a maximum sentence indication (MSI) given by the judge of 28 years.
At his sentencing hearing, Attin’s attorney, Michelle Ali, of the Public Defenders’ Department, argued that due to the state’s delay in filing the indictment for rape in October 1996, the court should consider applying a discount while deducting the time spent in custody since 1994, when he was arrested for the murders.
Waterman-Latchoo did not agree.
She also did not agree that the sentences should run concurrently, ordering that they run consecutively since, had he been sentenced in 1996, they would have been consecutive sentences.
Another man, Noel Seepersad, was also convicted of killing the women and sentenced to hang. He appealed his conviction, but his petition to the Privy Council for special leave was dismissed.
According to the facts involving the rape and other sexual offences charges, on the morning of July 11, 1994, the Scotts’ maid arrived at the home of her employers, Johnathon and Candace Scott, at Anchor Drive, Westmoorings.
Later that morning, Candace Scott left the house with her daughter, leaving the worker alone with the Scotts’ infant son.
Shortly before midday, two men arrived at the property claiming they were there to carry out painting work. After initially turning them away, when Johnathon Scott said he knew nothing about a painting job, the maid was later confronted inside the house.
According to court evidence, the men threatened to kill her, and she was ordered to take the baby upstairs, which she did.
While Seepersad ransacked the Scotts’ master bedroom, Attin forced the maid to kiss him before sexually assaulting her. Attin then got angry after he found out she lied about her name, and hit her with a chopper. He threatened to kill the child when he began to cry.
During the ordeal, the maid was allowed to bathe the baby, but while doing so, Attin cut off her underwear with a Chinese chopper. Moments later, he raped her while threatening her. She was also forced to perform oral sex on Seepersad.
During the ordeal, the victim was raped and buggered several times by both men.
When Candace Scott returned home in the afternoon, she was ambushed. A family friend, Karen Sa Gomes, also arrived and was similarly confronted. Police later discovered Scott and Sa Gomes’s bodies in separate rooms of the house.
Emergency calls were made later that day, and officers from the Four Roads Police Station responded. The maid was taken to the police station and then to a health facility, where forensic examinations were conducted.
Subsequent analysis confirmed the presence of biological evidence, and investigators recovered fingerprint evidence at the scene. Police processing of the crime scene continued in the days that followed, and Attin was identified by the maid in an identification parade, and Seepersad was seen driving Sa Gomes’s car on the same day with Attin as a passenger.
A policeman assigned to a specialised unit of the TTPS and a civilian – both charged with gun-related offences stemming from a December 10 incident aboard a pirogue on the Caroni River –will not face the High Court after prosecutors instead recommended a summary trial for both men.
As a result, PC Kushal Karamthesingh of the Anti-Extortion Unit and civilian Ramjit Ramlochan will have their matters heard in the magistrates court.
At a hearing on December 18, the police prosecutor informed Master Rhea Libert of the state’s recommendation for summary trial. Libert subsequently transferred the matter and Karamthesingh and Ramlochan are expected to appear before a magistrate on January 21.
During Thursday’s hearing, Karamthesingh’s attorney Terry Boyer requested specific disclosure of body-worn camera footage from officers of the Multi-Option Police Section of the Special Branch, who carried out the arrests. He also sought disclosure of drone footage.
The two first appeared before the court on December 17 after being charged on December 14.
Karamthesingh faces multiple charges, including transferring his Glock 48 pistol, transferring ten rounds of 9mm ammunition, possession of three 12-gauge cartridges, failing to have his Firearm User’s Licence while carrying firearms and ammunition in a public place, improper use of a TTPS-issued shotgun, and being unauthorised to keep the shotgun and five TTPS-issued 12-gauge cartridges.
Ramlochan is charged with possession of Karamthesingh’s Glock 48 pistol and ammunition. Karamthesingh and Ramlochan are on $175,000 and $120,000 bail, respectively.
Police alleged that around 11 pm on December 10, officers from the Multi-Option Police Section – a unit that was also involved in a multi-million-dollar drug seizure three hours later in the Caroni Swamp – were conducting an operation alongside officers from the Coastal and Riverine Patrol Unit to intercept a pirogue suspected of transporting narcotics.
According to investigators, officers observed a pirogue carrying four men and attempted to engage it. One of the men allegedly identified himself as a policeman and told officers he was hunting capybara.
During the hearing on December 18, police prosecutor Shala Julien said the state intended for both matters to be kept together. Attorneys David Carter and Vishal Persad represent Ramlochan.
GOVERNMENT has advised the public there will be new rules for the discharge of fireworks from December 19.
In a public advisory issued by the Office of the Attorney General on December 18, these rules are in accordance with the provisions of the Summary Offences (Amendment) Act 2025, which President Christine Kangaloo gave her assent to on December 16.
The legislation will be proclaimed on December 19.
The advisory said, “Fireworks may only be discharged with a permit issued by the Commissioner of Police (CoP), except on public holidays between 8 pm and 9 pm, and on December 31 between 11.30 pm and 12.30 am (January 1).”
This is already outlined in the legislation which states people will not need a permit to discharge fireworks during these times.
The bill states no one can discharge any fireworks without a valid permit issued by the CoP.
The legislation also states people cannot discharge fireworks within a half mile radius of registered animal shelters, zoos, farms where animals are reared, forest reserves national parks, public or private hospitals or airports.
This was repeated in the advisory which also indicated further details on permits and ticketable offences will be outlined in the Summary Offences (Fireworks) Regulations, 2025.
Those regulations will be published in the Gazette on December 19.
The bill was passed in the House of Representatives on December 9 with government and opposition MPs supporting it.
The Senate passed the bill on December 10.
In opening debate on the bill in the Senate, Attorney General John Jeremie said the objective of the bill is to “regulate the use of fireworks by way of a permit system, and to make breaches of the law a ticket offence.”
Jeremie said public servants in his ministry did considerable research on the issue of fireworks regulations while the bill was being drafted. He said they discovered a 1914 ordinance which only dealt with fireworks being only allowed on roads in towns and nowhere else.
Jeremie added the prevalence of fireworks at public events (such as Independence Day celebrations) and private events (birthday parties and weddings) shows how much the usage of these items has evolved over the last 100 years when that ordinance was created by legislators at that time.
He said studies by the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) have found that while creating colourful light displays for people to enjoy, fireworks also create destructive blast waves that harm the health of humans, animals and the environment.
THE Court of Appeal has upheld a ruling of the High Court in favour of former member of the Industrial Court Sam Maharaj, who was awarded more than $3 million in compensation for distress, inconvenience and pecuniary loss over the refusal of the Patrick Manning cabinet to renew his contract in 2000.
Justices of Appeal Gillian Lucky, Mira Dean-Armourer and Carla Brown-Antoine dismissed the appeal filed by the State against a 2019 ruling of Justice Frank Seepersad. A cross-appeal filed by Maharaj was also dismissed.
In a written decision in February 2019, in which he called for a review of the way appointments and re-appointments are made to that court, Seepersad ordered compensation for Maharaj of $3.17 million.
In December 2016, five months after Manning’s death, the London-based Privy Council delivered a ruling in favour of Maharaj, a former general secretary of the All Trinidad Sugar and General Workers Trade Union, and sent his case back to the High Court to determine compensation.
In 2000, the then-labour minister was reported to have told cabinet that Maharaj could neither “write, read nor speak properly and was not suited to be a member of the Industrial Court.” The cabinet, acting on this representation, declined to reappoint Maharaj.
The Court of Appeal, in December 2014, ruled in Maharaj’s favour, but no compensation was awarded.
Maharaj first brought the judicial-review action in January 2004. He was represented by Senior Counsel Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj and Nyala Badal.
THREE men charged in connection with the 2023 double murder of two women at a pool party in Arima were discharged by a High Court master, who ruled there was insufficient evidence against them.
Brian St Rose, Christian Hernandez and Brian Hernandez, all of Temple Street, Arima, were charged with the murders of Candice Griffith and Alana Layne, as well as the wounding of three others on April 17, 2023.
After a sufficiency hearing, Master Margaret Sookraj-Goswami ruled there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for murder against the three men, and they were discharged of all charges.
Police said that at about 10.35 pm on April 17, 2023, officers responded to reports of loud explosions on Temple Street. On arrival, they found several people suffering from gunshot wounds. Two women – one from Nelson Street, Arima, and the other from Temple Street – were pronounced dead on arrival at the Arima Hospital.
According to police, six assailants entered the premises and opened fire on a group of people attending a birthday pool party. The men were represented by a team of attorneys that included Pamela Elder, SC, Sallian Holdip-Francis, Russell Warner and Kareem Marcelle.
PROSECUTORS abruptly halted a judge-only trial against a Tobago man charged with two counts of causing the deaths of a fireman and his wife in 2023.
On the third day of the trial of Skeater Fredrick, who appeared before Justice Nalini Singh in the Scarborough High Court, charged with causing the deaths of Christian Adams and his wife, Teresa Alleyne-Adams, an employee with the Division of Finance, prosecutors offered no further evidence, bringing the case to an abrupt end.
Up to that point, Justice Singh had received formal admissions from eight prosecution witnesses, while three others gave evidence during the short-lived trial and were cross-examined by Fredrick’s attorney, John Heath, SC.
When the trial resumed on December 17, prosecutor Dylan Martin said, in keeping with the code for prosecutors, the evidence disclosed no reasonable prospect of securing a conviction. He said the Director of Public Prosecutions had directed the State to offer no further evidence. Fredrick was subsequently discharged by Justice Singh.
Also representing Fredrick was Adanna Joseph-Wallace, while Cassie Bisram also appeared for the prosecution.
The Adams were on their way to pick up their children when they were killed in an accident on the Claude Noel Highway.
At the time, police reported that a truck travelling east to west along the highway swerved after another vehicle travelling west to east entered its path as it approached the Rockly Vale traffic lights. The driver attempted to avoid the car but still collided with it. The truck then flipped and landed on the white Suzuki driven by Adams.
Police said the husband and wife were crushed and died at the scene. Officers were told they were on their way to pick up their three children from school when the crash occurred.
Eyewitnesses said the truck collided with two vehicles and landed on one. It was loaded with rocks, which fell onto the car, causing the fatalities. The truck later rolled down a hill near the botanical gardens as efforts were made to retrieve it.
A POLICE OFFICER, assigned to a specialised unit of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), and a civilian made their first court appearance on December 17 after being charged with gun-related offences stemming from a December 10 incident aboard a pirogue on the Caroni River.
PC Kushal Karamthesingh, of the Anti-Extortion Unit, and Ramjit Ramlochan appeared before Master Rhea Libert in the North C court, when she read out the indictably-laid charges.
Karamthesingh faces multiple charges, including transferring his Glock 48 pistol, transferring 10 rounds of 9mm ammunition, possession of three 12-gauge cartridges, failing to have his Firearm User’s Licence when carrying legal firearms and ammunition in a public place, improper use of a TTPS-issued shotgun, and being unauthorised to keep both the shotgun and five TTPS-issued 12-gauge cartridges. Ramlochan was charged with possession of Karamthesingh’s Glock 48 pistol and ammunition.
At the hearing, Libert regularised bail previously granted by justices of the peace at the St Joseph Police Station on December 14, setting bail at $175,000 for Karamthesingh and $120,000 for Ramlochan.
Police alleged that around 11 pm on December 10, officers of the Multi-Option Police Section (MOPS) of the Special Branch, a unit that was also instrumental in the multi-million-dollar drug seizure three hours later in the Caroni Swamp, were working alongside officers from the Coastal and Riverine Patrol Unit, conducting an operation at the Caroni Swamp to locate a pirogue suspected of conveying narcotics. The officers allegedly observed a pirogue with four men and decided to engage it. One of the men allegedly identified himself as a police officer. Police alleged that they were told by their colleague that he was hunting capybara, declaring also that he had a TTPS-issued Remington shotgun with three 12-gauge cartridges.
Investigators said the officer was found with unauthorised weapons and ammunition, along with two licensed firearms. One of the licensed firearms was allegedly given to a second man, who police said had it tucked into the waistband of his pants.
At the time of the arrest, investigators said the officer did not have his firearm user’s licence or his police identification card in his possession. The four men were arrested and later transferred to officers at the Ferry Terminal on Wrightson Road, Port of Spain.
A subsequent search allegedly revealed five additional 12-gauge cartridges in the officer’s pocket. It was further alleged that the TTPS shotgun and ammunition had been issued to the police officer for a police exercise, but he failed to return them. Investigators also said the officer later produced an FUL covering the pistols.
During the hearing, prosecutor Shala Julien said the State intended for both matters to be kept together but requested a short adjournment as Ramlochan’s criminal record was not yet available. Defence attorney Terry Boyer objected, citing the purpose of the Administration of Justice (Indictable Proceedings) Act to avoid delays. He pressed for an early trial since he said it would “be very revealing.”
Boyer also requested the return of one of Karamthesingh’s Glock pistols that is not part of the charges, citing safety concerns due to his client’s occupation. Attorneys David Carter and Vishal Persad represent Ramlochan. Both men are expected to return to court on December 18 to determine if the matter will progress to a sufficiency hearing before Liebert or summarily before a magistrate.
Attorneys are also expected to address an issue raised by the master, who admitted she knew Karamthesingh, having previously encountered him in his professional capacity as a police officer.
A HIGH COURT JUDGE on December 15 quashed decisions by the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) that allowed a concrete batching plant in Chase Village to operate without proper environmental approval, ruling the regulator acted unlawfully and ordering the plant to shut down.
Justice Nadia Kangaloo held that the EMA’s decisions permitting Central Concrete and Pumps Ltd to continue operations, including the grant of a certificate of environmental clearance, were illegal, irrational, and breached procedural fairness.
The ruling came in a judicial review claim brought by Everton Phillip, a Chase Village pensioner who lives near the Derrick Road facility and said he has been affected for years by noise and dust from the plant’s operations.
In her order, Kangaloo declared the EMA’s decisions “null and void and of no effect,” quashing those decisions while compelling the authority to cancel and expunge the CEC, which was issued on April 15, 2024, to Central Concrete and Pumps Ltd.
The court further directed the EMA to take immediate enforcement action to require the company to cease all operations at the concrete batching plant until it properly applies for and obtains a CEC in accordance with Section 35 of the Environmental Management Act.
Phillip was also awarded damages for losses caused by the impugned decisions, including aggravated or exemplary damages. The amount will be assessed by a master in chambers. The EMA was ordered to pay Phillip’s legal costs.
The court granted a stay of its orders until January 26, 2026.
Phillip first received the court’s permission to challenge the EMA’s actions in February 2024. He contested a decision conveyed by letter dated November 30, 2023, in which the EMA allowed the company to continue operating the plant before obtaining a CEC, and the authority’s failure to enforce the law by shutting down the facility.
Phillip said he lived on Derrick Road, Chase Village, close to the plant, and has been affected by its operations since 2003. He said two concrete batching plants were established on the site, one in 2003 and another in 2013, in an area zoned residential and commercial.
According to Phillip, complaints were made over the years to the Town and Country Planning Division, the Chaguanas Borough Corporation, the EMA, and the Ombudsman. An EMA investigating officer in 2014 recommended legal action and issued a notice of violation, but the authority later entered into a consent agreement with the company that did not require it to obtain a CEC or immediately cease operations.
Phillip argued that the EMA had a continuing statutory duty to enforce the law and that the ongoing operations continued to adversely affect him and other residents.
Central Concrete and Pumps Ltd was named as an interested party in the proceedings. Kingsley Walesby and Stephanie Rajkumar represented Phillip. Ian Benjamin, SC, Tekiyah Jorsling and Rachel Ramoodith represented the EMA while Shiv Sharma appeared for Central Concrete and Pumps Ltd.
