The High Court has dismissed a claim brought by a registered nurse against the South West Regional Health Authority (SWRHA) over salary deductions made following her prolonged illness.
In dismissing Nicolia McLean-Kelly’s lawsuit on January 26, Justice Westmin James ruled that the SWRHA acted lawfully and within the terms of the employment contract.
“The deductions from the claimant’s salary arose directly from the formal reclassification of her leave as unpaid following exhaustion of her contractual entitlement.
“The claimant argues that because she was initially paid in full while hospitalised at the defendant’s institution, the subsequent recovery of salary was unlawful or unfair. I do not accept that contention,” the judge wrote.
In deciding the case, Justice James held that the SWRHA neither breached McLean-Kelly’s contract nor improperly exercised its discretion in classifying periods of her illness as leave without pay.
McLean-Kelly had sued to recover $63,482.08 deducted from her salary after the SWRHA reclassified portions of her sick leave as unpaid. She also sought damages for breach of contract, loss of gratuity amounting to $13,917, aggravated and exemplary damages, and interest.
The nurse, who has been employed at the San Fernando General Hospital since 2018, became critically ill in July 2020 after contracting mycoplasma pneumonia while on duty. She was hospitalised for several weeks, including more than three weeks in the Intensive Care Unit, during which she suffered cardiac arrests and later underwent emergency lung surgery. She also sustained an unrelated injury in July 2021.
McLean-Kelly argued that the SWRHA unlawfully reclassified her sick leave as leave without pay and made unauthorised monthly deductions from her salary without notice. She contended that the SWRHA failed to properly exercise its discretion under her contract and should have treated her absence as paid sick leave or injury leave, given the severity of her condition.
The SWRHA denied the claim, maintaining that under clause 9(a) of the employment contract, contracted employees are entitled to only 14 working days of paid sick leave per contract year, with any additional leave granted at the employer’s discretion. The SWRHA said McLean-Kelly exhausted that entitlement by late July 2020 and that subsequent payments amounted to overpayments of public funds, which it was legally obliged to recover.
Justice James held that the contract clearly limited paid sick leave to 14 days and gave the employer a broad discretion to determine whether any extended sick leave should be paid. He found that this discretion was lawfully exercised in accordance with established HR policies applicable to contract employees, which “normally” provide for extended sick leave without pay.
He rejected the claimant’s argument that internal HR guidelines unlawfully overrode her contract, noting that the contract expressly required employees to comply with applicable policies and procedures. The judge also found it implausible that the claimant, as a senior nurse in a highly regulated institution, was unaware of the existence of such policies.
In his ruling, Justice James concluded that the SWRHA’s decision was rational, non-arbitrary, and consistent with how other contract employees are treated. He ruled that the SWRHA was entitled to distinguish between contract and permanent staff and that the seriousness of McLean-Kelly’s illness, while justifying extended leave, did not compel the payment of salary beyond her contractual entitlement.
On the issue of deductions, he found that the overpayments arose because medical certificates could only be issued at the end of hospitalisation and that HR was therefore unable to reclassify the leave sooner. Once the overpayments were identified, the authority was legally bound under the Exchequer and Audit Act to recover the funds.
In dismissing the claim in its entirety, the judge ordered McLean-Kelly to pay the SWRHA’s prescribed costs of $19,479.80, excluding VAT. A 90-day stay of execution was granted.
McLean-Kelly was represented by Nigel Transcoso and Shivanna Kitwaroo, while the SWRHA was represented by Michael Rooplal and Marissa Ciara Ramsoondar.
THE Privy Council has upheld a Court of Appeal ruling that found an obstetrician negligent for failing to ensure foetal heart rate monitoring during a delayed emergency caesarean section that led to catastrophic brain injuries at birth.
The case arose from a claim brought by Nicole Singh, mother of Christopher Singh, over injuries Christopher suffered during delivery by emergency caesarean section at St Augustine Private Hospital. Christopher was born at 11.13 am on September 9, 2012, after prolonged oxygen deprivation and was later diagnosed with severe cerebral palsy, leaving him unable to walk, talk, sit, or stand independently. He continues to suffer from severe physical impairment and is non-verbal.
At trial, Justice Betsy Ann Lambert Peterson found the hospital negligent for systemic failures that caused delays in carrying out the caesarean section, including late contact with an anaesthetist and the absence of a theatre assistant. Those delays were found to have caused Christopher’s injuries. The hospital’s appeal was dismissed, and liability against it was not in dispute before the Privy Council.
The trial judge, however, dismissed the claim against Dr Prakashbhan Persad, a consultant at the hospital, holding that his conduct met the required standard of care. In July 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned that finding, concluding that Dr Persad bore responsibility for failing to ensure monitoring of the foetal heart rate during the roughly 50 minutes Mrs Singh waited in the operating theatre before delivery. The Appeal Court held that, without such monitoring, Dr Persad and the anaesthetist were unaware that the foetus was in distress and did not act with appropriate urgency.
In a detailed judgment on January 19, the Privy Council agreed with the Court of Appeal that Persad’s role was “overarching and supervisory” once an emergency caesarean section was contemplated. The judgment noted that while midwives ordinarily carry out foetal heart rate monitoring, it was Dr Persad’s responsibility to ensure he had the information necessary to assess the foetus’s condition and direct the team accordingly.
“In the board’s judgment, the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Dr Persad was negligent in failing to ensure that he kept himself and his team aware of the FHR (foetal heart rate), which would have indicated the distressed condition of the foetus during the crucial period of the second stage of labour in the operating theatre.
“Although no doubt it is the midwives who would actually have carried out the FHR monitoring in the operating theatre, it was Dr Persad’s responsibility to ensure that he had the information he needed to be able to assess the condition of the foetus.
“He should have been aware throughout of whether or not the foetus was in distress so that he could act accordingly. It is not a matter of holding him responsible for the failings of the midwives or of the hospital.
“If Dr Persad had asked the midwives in the operating theatre to start measuring Christopher’s heart rate whilst everyone was waiting for the theatre assistant to arrive or whilst Dr Gangadhararao Narra (anaesthetist) was attempting to insert the spinal anaesthetic needle, they could and would have done so.
“That would have made apparent the distress Christopher was experiencing in utero, the C-section could have been carried out immediately, and Christopher would not have suffered such catastrophic injuries.
“The Court of Appeal were right to say that once a surgical process was contemplated, only the surgeon could be in charge of managing the process from that point.
This fundamental point was obscured by the focus at the trial and in the judgment on the output, or lack of it, of the CTG machine which had monitored the FHR whilst Mrs Singh was on the maternity ward.
“A further point that may have distracted attention from what should have been the main issue was the debate over the difference in the role of the consultant obstetrician in a private hospital compared with a consultant obstetrician in a public hospital.
“There may certainly be differences between the position in the public and private health sector as regards the vicarious liability of the hospital for the failures of the consultants it employs. But there has been no suggestion that it is any less important in a private hospital than in a public hospital for the obstetrician to ensure that he or she has the information needed to make the correct decisions as to how to proceed when it becomes clear that a natural birth is not possible. “The Board is firmly of the view that the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Dr Persad was negligent in failing to ensure that he and Dr Narra were aware of the baby’s condition during the 50 minutes when Mrs Singh was in the operating theatre.”
In its judgment, delivered by current Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh, with Justices Nolan Bereaux and Maria Wilson concurring, the Court of Appeal held that Persad’s role “was overarching and supervisory of the entire process.”
“He was the team leader. A midwife cannot have responsibility in a surgical procedure.”
Boodoosingh wrote, “Dr Persad may not have been responsible for all of the delay, but he failed to be proactive and failed to manage the consequences of the delay as was his responsibility…
“Neither the hospital nor Dr Persad treated this delivery with the urgency required, and they are therefore, on the judge’s findings of fact, both liable in negligence.
In its judgment, delivered by Lady Vivien Rose, the Privy Council rejected arguments that the allegation was unfairly pleaded or not properly put to Dr Persad at trial, finding that the pleadings, expert evidence and cross-examination clearly raised the issue of inadequate monitoring in the operating theatre. It also accepted evidence that foetal heart rate monitoring could have been performed manually and would likely have revealed distress, prompting faster delivery.
Although dismissing his appeal, the London-based court agreed with Dr Persad on limited points, holding that he was not negligent merely for the overall time between the decision to perform a caesarean section and delivery in the absence of known foetal distress, nor for briefly leaving the operating theatre during the administration of anaesthesia.
“In so far as this is intended to be a finding of negligence based merely on his absence separate from the wider point about delay, the Board agrees with Dr Persad that there is no basis for concluding either that a consultant is expected to be in the operating theatre for the whole period prior to the start of surgery or that Dr Persad’s absence had any effect on the progress of events.”
Also presiding over the appeal at the Privy Council were Lords Lloyd-Jones, Briggs, Leggatt and Richards. Attorneys Renald Davidson and Terrance Neale represented Dr Persad at the Privy Council.
Nicole Singh was represented by Michael Powers, KC and Ravi Heffes-Doon, instructed by Neela Ramsundar. Ian Benjamin, SC, Vanessa Gopaul and Elena Araujo represented the hospital as an intervener.
A New Grant man has been committed to three days in prison for willfully disobeying a court order to pay damages arising from a 2012 assault and battery claim, despite having the means to do so. Justice Frank Seepersad made the order against Groodial Badal on January 15.
While maintaining that contempt orders must never be used oppressively to punish poverty, he acknowledged that they were justified where a party deliberately refuses to comply with a lawful order. He ruled that Badal’s conduct amounted to willful disobedience and committed him to three days’ simple imprisonment, refusing an application for a stay.
“The dispensation of justice at times necessitates an empathetic approach to the application of the rule of law,” Seepersad said. “However, where there has been willful disobedience and/or an unjustified refusal to obey the terms of a court order despite having the means to do so, the court must protect and preserve its authority and dispassionately apply the full force of the law.”
Addressing Badal directly, the judge said, “You are in contempt for your failure to make any payment. This does not absolve you of payment of the balance owed. I hope it gives you time to reflect. Your obligations will be met as soon as you are released from custody.”
The court found that evidence showed Badal had multiple streams of income and failed to provide any proof that he was unable to pay any portion of the judgment debt. Seepersad described Badal’s conduct as “nonchalance” and “pervicacious disobedience.”
“Compliance with court orders is not optional. It is mandatory. It is regrettable that in this society disregard for the law appears to be entrenched, and far too often, citizens only comply with legal obligations under the threat of severe sanction.
“Sadly, the ‘big stick over your head syndrome’ seems to be engraved and entrenched into the social fabric, and only its presence and use catalyses compliance,” the judge said.
In sending a warning, he added, “One’s deliberate unlawful actions does attract consequences and persons must be held to account when they are guilty of wrongdoing or volitionally defy orders of the court.”
Balkaran, also of New Grant, sought the committal order after Badal failed to comply with a consent order dated April 20, 2016. The original claim, filed in June 2012, arose out of an assault and battery matter. Judgment in default was entered in April 2014 after Badal failed to file an appearance or defence, though it was later set aside and the defence filed. The matter was ultimately compromised by consent.
Under the consent order, Badal agreed to pay $70,000, inclusive of interest and costs, with a lump-sum payment due in May 2016 and the remaining balance to be paid in monthly installments of $1,500 starting June 30, 2016. Court records showed that since June 2016, Badal paid $22,000 by January 2020 and a further $1,500 in May 2024.
Statutory interest at five percent continued to accrue and that, as of February 17, 2025, the total sum due and owing stood at $68,523.10. Balkaran’s application said Badal owned his home in New Grant and operated a roti shop and a burger cart, demonstrating an ability to pay while refusing to do so.
Seepersad noted that the matter had been before the court for a significant period and that every opportunity had been afforded to Badal to satisfy his obligations, even in part.
The imprisonment order takes immediate effect, though the outstanding debt remains payable in full. Attorney Ravi Bunsee represented Balkaran while Mustapha Khan represented Badal, who said he paid a $15,000 lump sum and was able to pay $7,000 by January 32, 2019. He said he was always willing to pay the $1,500, even asking for banking information, but Balkaran refused. He said his financial situation worsened after the pandemic and his monthly expenses are more than his income. He also claimed he remained unemployed since covid19 and started receiving NIS payments in 2021. His defence maintained that Balkaran had not established that he had the means to pay the judgment but that he was willing to continue paying monthly installments of $1,000 to satisfy the debt.
Heatwave Cycling Club and national cyclist Alexi Costa-Ramirez have filed an appeal challenging a High Court decision that refused to halt selection trials by the TT Cycling Federation (TTCF) for the upcoming Pan American Track Cycling Championships.
In a notice of appeal filed on January 14, the club and cyclist asked the Court of Appeal to set aside an order made by High Court judge Justice Westmin James on January 13, which dismissed their application for an interim injunction aimed at stopping endurance trials scheduled for January 17.
The appeal arises from proceedings which involved Costa, and Njisane Phillip and Makaira Wallace of JLD Cycling Academy, and their clubs, contesting the federation’s selection process for the February championships.
The appellants (Heatwave and Costa) argue that the decision to refuse interim relief was wrong. They challenge the judge’s finding that some claimants had already been able to submit performance data without attending the trials, and the conclusion that stopping the trials would cause greater harm to the federation than to the appellants.
In the grounds of appeal, the appellants argue that the trial judge erred in finding there was no implied contractual obligation requiring the federation to treat athletes fairly during the selection process.
They further challenge the conclusion that damages would be an adequate remedy where elite athletes could be denied the opportunity to compete at a “prestigious international competition, like the Pan American Championships, and therefore possibly the Olympic Games.”
The appeal also states that stopping the trials would not disadvantage the federation, while proceeding with them could cause irreversible harm to athletes at a critical point in the Olympic cycle.
As part of the relief sought, Costa and her club are asking the Court of Appeal to restrain the federation from holding the January 17 trials for endurance athletes and to award costs of both the appeal and the proceedings.
The appellants also indicated their intention to apply for the appeal to be expedited under Part 64.10 of the Civil Proceedings Rules, citing the time-sensitive nature of the selection process ahead of the continental championships.
THE judge presiding over the civil claim against Dr Avinash Sawh, the doctor who was suspended in 2023 for making racially insensitive remarks two years earlier, will deliver his decision on June 24.
Justice Christopher Sieuchand has indicated that he will deliver his decision on June 24. He gave the date and directions for the filing of submissions at the end of the second and final day of intense cross examination by lead attorney for Chantelle Arielle Figaro, a former employee on January 14.
Figaro has sued Sawh, his wife Allison Dass-Sawh and Sawh’s Medical Associates for constructive dismissal, assault and battery, breach of contract and related damages arising out of her employment at Sawh’s Medical Associates between October 2019 and October 2020.
She has alleged the Sawhs verbally abused and cursed her and created a toxic working environment while withholding overtime payment.
On the second day of the trial held virtually, Sawh was cross-examined by Figaro’s attorney Prakash Ramadhar, who questioned him extensively on recordings, alleged racial abuse, unsafe medical practices and the circumstances surrounding Figaro’s resignation.
Sawh admitted that during the covid19 pandemic he breached quarantine by going into his medical establishment around midnight, although he claimed he went only to sanitise the office. He acknowledged that Figaro was not working at that time, but said he assumed she reported him to the authorities for the breach. He told the court that he blamed Figaro initially, but that he later apologised.
Police later visited the establishment and Sawh conceded that he had a “bad outburst” and apologised for it, telling the court he was angry and trying to determine who had reported the breach.
A recording from October 28, 2020 was played in which Sawh was heard using offensive language towards Figaro after a visit to the clinic by one of her relatives, a police officer. Sawh admitted that in moments of anger he used racial language, describing it as “abhorrent,” and accepted that he said words to the effect of “dunce niggers” and that they “take bribes,” though he said he could not recall his exact words.
He claimed he was angry because he believed Figaro had lied about the visitor being her cousin, as there were several armed officers in the office at the time. “I am not a liar,” he told the court, while maintaining that Figaro had lied to him.
Sawh also suggested that many of the voice notes and recordings relied upon by Figaro were fabricated. Several recordings were played during the hearing, including ones in which instructions were allegedly given to staff.
Dr Sawh accepted that he gave instructions to staff to administer drugs, but insisted this only occurred when he was present or advising by phone. He denied that Figaro treated patients without supervision and rejected claims that expired drugs had their expiry dates erased, describing that allegation as “definitely fabricated.”
He also denied that the clinic’s ECG machine was non-functional, explaining that it was simply a paper jam. He said patients were still given ECGs and other doctors continued to refer patients to him.
In his testimony, Sawh categorically denied allegations of sexual harassment and assault, including an alleged incident on July 31, 2020 in which Figaro claimed he slapped her on her buttocks. “I never touched her,” he said. He also said he never found her attractive.
He further denied that his wife abused Figaro or that they created a toxic work environment. While he acknowledged a confrontation over a job letter, he accused Figaro of dishonesty and forgery in relation to employment letters. When questioned about unpaid overtime, Sawh said he was unsure, noting that his wife handled payroll matters. Although he said he kept a diary of patients and staff hours, no records were produced in court.
Sawh also accepted that although his witness statement said he did not designate nursing tasks to Figaro because she was not trained as a nurse, he later admitted she did perform such duties.
In her testimony under cross-examination by Ramadhar, Dass-Sawh said she handled payroll and administrative matters at the clinic. She admitted using obscene language in a recorded conversation relating to a dispute over a job letter, but claimed the recording was edited and that curse words were added.
She denied breaching any quarantine order or using demeaning or abusive language towards Figaro during discussions. While accepting that it was her voice in a recording played in court, she insisted not all the words were hers and maintained that parts of the conversation were fabricated.
Dass-Sawh denied ever telling Figaro to leave the office or locking her out. She rejected claims that Figaro was regularly required to work overtime and said Figaro had requested evening shifts. Although she told the court she had timesheets and documents to counter the overtime claims, she acknowledged these were not included in her witness statement.
Dass-Sawh denied being jealous of Figaro and insisted the work environment was neither toxic nor unhealthy. She said neither she nor her husband insulted or abused Figaro or caused her to leave her employment.
Defence witness Annalisa Ralph Sammy, an employee of the clinic, also testified, addressing the alleged July 31, 2020 incident. She told the court she was present in the office with Sawh and Figaro and briefly left the room to answer a phone call. She said she did not observe or hear any inappropriate behaviour by Sawh.
Sammy testified that Figaro later complained to her that Sawh had slapped her on the buttocks, but said both Sawh and Figaro were within her clear sight at the time. She said that she discussed the allegation with the Sawhs and that security camera footage was reviewed, revealing no evidence to support Figaro’s claim. However, the alleged footage was not presented to the court.
“I came here to speak the truth,” Sammy said. In addition to giving directions for the filing of submissions, Figaro’s attorneys were also ordered to provide written transcripts of the recordings submitted into evidence.
Figaro is seeking declarations of repudiatory breach of contract, constructive dismissal, assault and battery, breach of implied employment terms.
She has alleged she was subjected to repeated verbal abuse, racially offensive language, sexual harassment, unsafe medical practices, and assaults during her employment, leading to severe psychological harm including depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation. She also claimed loss of future earning capacity and reputational damage.
In 2023, the Medical Board of Trinidad and Tobago suspended Sawh for one week after finding him guilty of “infamous and disgraceful conduct” arising from a race-related rant against Figaro in 2020. Recordings of that incident circulated widely on social media, prompting calls for his medical licence to be revoked. Sawh later issued a public apology.
Figaro is also represented by attorneys Saira Lakhan and Kristian Dass, while Sawh is represented by Mario Merritt, Lemuel Murphy and Survana Jaimungal.
TWO men charged in connection with a July 2023 attempted kidnapping and shooting in Arima were discharged by the High Court after the prosecution again failed to meet court-ordered deadlines.
Dwight Yorke (not the footballer) and Shaquille Sandy appeared before Master Whitney Franklin on January 14, for a non-compliance hearing relating to serious charges arising from events on July 14, 2023, at the corner of Martinez Street and Arima Old Road.
Yorke was represented by attorneys Keron Ramkhalwhan and Anwar Hosein, while Sandy was represented by Shaun Fulchan. The state was represented by prosecutor Ian Caldeira.
At the hearing, Master Franklin questioned the prosecution over its failure to file and serve an indictment by the January 9 deadline. Caldeira explained that he had recently taken over the case after the previous prosecutor was transferred and admitted he was not fully briefed. When asked whether an indictment had been filed, he conceded that it had not.
The master noted that the prosecution had already been granted multiple extensions, dating back to July 2025, to file the indictment and submit outstanding witness statements. She reminded of a prior order explicitly warning that no further extensions would be granted due to the prosecution’s “blatant and unwanted disregard” for court directions.
“I have already noted your indication that you are not the regular prosecutor and you are not apprised of the information. However, that does not absolve you of responsibility in this matter — the state is one indivisible whole, and the facts are what they are,” Master Franklin said.
Attorneys Fulchan and Ramkhalwhan argued that, given the lack of compliance, the court should not extend time further. Ramkhalwhan argued that the allegations against the men were serious and included a claim that his client was involved in a gang, yet no evidence had been properly placed before the court. He also pointed out that both accused had previously been denied bail, making the prosecution’s delay even more troubling.
The defence submitted that, in the absence of any indictment or explanation for the delay, the court was empowered to discharge the accused since, as of January 14 — several days past the court’s deadline — no indictment had been filed. Court records showed the last document filed by the prosecution was on July 15, 2025, and it was not an indictment. Franklin noted that the indictment is the initiating document required for the matter to proceed and in line with her earlier orders, she discharged both men for non-compliance. Franklin described the outcome as a “sad day for justice” but commended the defence for highlighting the prosecution’s failures. The sufficiency hearing scheduled for April will no longer take place.
The allegations stem from events on the morning of July 14, 2023. Around 6.30 am, one of the alleged victims was standing at the corner of Martinez Street and Arima Old Road when a purple Toyota Aqua pulled up. According to the prosecution, one of the accused approached the victim while another, armed with a firearm, held the car door open. A second vehicle arrived with men who reportedly came to the victim’s aid.
The Toyota Aqua initially drove off but later returned, and one of the men allegedly fired at a second victim, causing injuries, before fleeing.
Yorke and Sandy faced multiple charges, including attempted kidnapping, shooting with intent, wounding with intent, possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of a firearm and ammunition with intent to endanger life.
A group of six individuals detained under preventative detention orders has signaled its intention to pursue judicial review proceedings against the Minister of Homeland Security and the Review Tribunal for what they claim are unreasonable delays in the disclosure of reports detailing the necessity of their continued detention.
The six detainees – Rajaee Ali, Robert Paul, Roniee Seeth, Denesh Maharaj, Diego Fuentes, and Eesha Joseph – are currently held at the Eastern Correctional and Rehabilitation Centre, Santa Rosa. Their attorney Keron Ramkhalwhan claims that, despite statutory requirements, the Minister of Homeland Security has failed to provide them with the recommendations of the Review Tribunal concerning the continuation of their detention.
In a pre-action letter on January 13, Ramkhalwhan noted that the relevant procedures are governed by the Emergency Powers Regulations (EPR) 2025, established following the declaration of a state of emergency on 18 July 2025. The Review Tribunal, formed under the Constitution and EPR, is responsible for assessing the legality and necessity of preventative detention orders issued by the minister.
“The law is unequivocal,” Ramkhalwhan said, adding, “all such decisions and disclosures must be carried out promptly, particularly where individual liberty is at stake. The ongoing delay is not only unreasonable but constitutes a flagrant breach of the duties imposed on public authorities to act without undue delay.”
According to the legal correspondence, reports regarding two of the detainees, Rajaee Ali and Robert Paul, were submitted to the minister on December 27, yet the minister has not disclosed these reports to the detainees. Reports for the remaining four individuals are yet to be produced by the tribunal.
Ramkhalwhan reminded that Section 15 of the Judicial Review Act, allows individuals to challenge administrative decisions that have been unreasonably delayed. He has requested that the minister and the tribunal comply by January 16, failing which the six detainees are prepared to seek court orders, including declarations of unreasonable delay and orders to compel disclosure of the reports.
A 48-YEAR-OLD man from Indian Walk in Moruga is expected to face a master in the High Court on December 30, charged with two sexual offences, including rape, against a woman.
The suspect, from Andres Avenue in the Princes Town Police District, was arrested on Christmas Day, the same day the alleged offences occurred.
PC Ramdatt of the Princes Town CID was given instructions to charge him with rape and buggery.
On the afternoon of December 25, police from Princes Town CID and the charge room responded to a report from the victim.
A doctor examined her, and the suspect was arrested shortly after.
Under the guidance of Snr Supt Simon, Supt Bridgelal, Insp Wilkinson, acting Sgt Teeluck, and the supervision of Cpl Ramkissoon, on December 29, PC Ramdatt was instructed to lay the two charges.
The suspect is expected to appear in the South B Court.
A High Court judge has dismissed a judicial review claim brought by a Coast Guard officer who challenged a decision not to recommend or grant his promotion.
Justice Devindra Rampersad dismissed Jeffery Hernandez’s claim, ruling that the decision was lawful and fell within the discretion of the military authorities.
Rampersad court found that while Hernandez met the seniority and examination requirements for promotion, the Commanding Officer and the Defence Force Commissions Board acted rationally in assessing his overall suitability, including unresolved disciplinary concerns, and did not act unfairly, unreasonably or in breach of constitutional rights.
Hernandez, a lieutenant since June 19, 2013, sought declarations, and orders to quash the decisions and compel his promotion to acting lieutenant commander from June 19, 2020, and substantive lieutenant commander from June 19, 2022, along with back pay and damages.
In a claim filed March 27, 2024, Hernandez argued that he had a legitimate expectation of promotion based on service length, performance appraisals and past practice. He further contended that it was unlawful and unconstitutional for decision-makers to rely on unresolved court-martial charges dating back to 2016, which he said were now statute-barred, as a basis to deny promotion.
The background to the dispute centered on allegations that Hernandez, while a training officer, had an unduly familiar relationship with an officer cadet under his supervision, contrary to the Defence Force fraternisation policy. Four disciplinary charges were laid in 2016, including scandalous conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, but no court-martial determination had been made.
Then commanding officer, Capt Steve Don Riguel Polo, said in affidavit evidence that the allegations, the seriousness with which they were treated and their implications for discipline, morale and leadership meant he could not recommend Hernandez for promotion. Hernandez denied disobeying any direct order, challenged the legality of the fraternisation policy and maintained that his appraisals consistently rated him “Good” or “Very Good.”
In analysing the evidence, Justice Rampersad stressed that it was not determining guilt or innocence and was not exercising appellate or disciplinary jurisdiction. Instead, he said the court’s role was limited to assessing whether the decisions challenged were unlawful, irrational or procedurally improper.
The judge held that, at the time the promotion decisions were made, the fraternisation policy was in force and had not been declared unconstitutional. The existence of formal charges and the institutional concerns they generated were capable of being considered by a reasonable decision-maker when assessing suitability for senior command, even though the court-martial proceedings may now be statute-barred.
Justice Rampersad also rejected Hernandez’s argument that unresolved allegations could not be taken into account, drawing a distinction between punitive findings of misconduct and evaluative judgments about suitability for promotion. It found that the presumption of innocence did not prevent commanders from considering whether pending matters affected confidence in an officer’s fitness for higher rank.
“The court draws a clear distinction between punitive action and evaluative judgment. The latter does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does it amount to a finding of guilt.
“On the evidence before the court, it was open to the Commanding Officer to conclude that the claimant’s suitability for promotion was affected by the circumstances surrounding the fraternisation allegations, irrespective of their ultimate legal disposition.
“The court therefore cannot conclude that the refusal to recommend the claimant for promotion fell outside the range of rational responses available to a reasonable decision-maker acting within the applicable regulatory framework.”
While acknowledging Hernandez’s strong professional record and positive appraisals, the court noted that his commanding officers consistently referenced the pending disciplinary issues as a factor affecting confidence and future progression. Promotion within the Coast Guard, the judge said, was not automatic and remains discretionary, dependent on suitability as well as seniority and examinations.
He further ruled that Hernandez had not established any clear representation or settled practice giving rise to a legitimate expectation of promotion, nor any fixed “due date” for advancement.
“The defendants have submitted that the claimant has not shown any clear, unambiguous promise of promotion, any consistent regular practice applicable to his situation and any basis on which an expectation could legally arise.
“In this case, the claimant was not recommended for promotion. The factors included his conduct, performance and devotion to duty. However, the discretionary factors of suitability to be determined by the commanding officers are, in the court’s respectful view, a valid and weighty consideration.
“As a result, under the regulatory framework, the defendants say that the claimant cannot rely on any legitimate expectation in circumstances where no such solution arose.
“The claimant has not established the existence of a clear, unambiguous representation or settled practice amounting to a legitimate expectation of promotion. Promotion within the Coast Guard remains discretionary and dependent on suitability.”
Claims relating to the promotion of junior officers ahead of him were also dismissed, with the court accepting evidence that those officers met all eligibility requirements at the relevant time.
Hernandez was represented by Arden Williams, Mariah Ramrattan and Anthony Moore. The state was represented by Natoya Moore and Raquel Le Blanc, instructed by Savitri Maharaj and Chelsea Downes.
THE High Court has ruled that The Surgical Specialist Centre Ltd wrongfully dismissed its former managing director, Elizabeth Kelly, but also ordered her to repay more than $215,000 to the company for unauthorised payments.
In a recent judgment delivered by Justice Jacqueline Wilson, the court found that while Kelly must reimburse the company for sums she conceded were improperly taken from its accounts, the centre failed to prove that she breached her fiduciary duties as a director, rendering her dismissal unjustified.
The claim arose after the breakdown of the personal and business relationship between Kelly and Dr Alan de Freitas, a director and shareholder of the medical facility. The Surgical Specialist Centre alleged Kelly misappropriated company funds, made unauthorised payments and breached her fiduciary obligations, leading to her termination in November 2022. Kelly accepted responsibility for several disputed transactions but counterclaimed that her dismissal was wrongful and sought damages.
The court heard that the company was incorporated in June 2016, with de Freitas and Kelly as equal shareholders and directors, and began operations in 2018 after acquiring a private medical business. Its operations were financed through multiple bank loans, including a major loan from an investment company, which governed salary arrangements and certain financial controls.
Justice Wilson found that the company’s financial arrangements, particularly concerning the payment of personal and household expenses from company accounts, were informal, loosely defined and applied inconsistently to both principals.
As a result, the court concluded that the claimant failed to establish a breach of fiduciary duty by Kelly and that the loss of trust cited by the company did not justify her summary dismissal.
“Both parties have admitted to using company funds for personal expenses,” the judge said, noting that the lack of clarity and consistency in the financial arrangements had to be resolved in Kelly’s favour.
“There was no written contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant, and the question whether there was a breach of contract, for which the defendant is entitled to damages, must be determined on the facts of the case,” the judge said.
She added, “In the circumstances and having regard to the undefined scope of the personal expenses for which the claimant was liable, the overall flexibility in the financial arrangements and the inconsistency in their application, I have concluded that the claimant has failed to establish that the defendant has acted in breach of her fiduciary duty.
“The lack of clarity in the claimant’s financial arrangements or consistency in their application must be resolved in the defendant’s favour.
“Her dismissal was, therefore, unjustified, and she is entitled to damages for breach of contract.”
On damages, the judge determined that Kelly, who earned a monthly salary of $20,000, was entitled to six months’ notice, awarding her $120,000 for wrongful dismissal. That amount is to be deducted from the $215,724.05 she agreed to repay to the company.
The court ordered Kelly to pay the company $215,724.05 and prescribed costs of $41,358. The Surgical Specialist Centre was also ordered to pay Kelly $120,000 in damages and prescribed costs of $27,000 on her counterclaim.
Naline Sharma and Andrea Goddard represented Surgical Specialist Ltd while Jean Louis Kelly and Natalie King represented Kelly.
A High Court judge has dismissed a constitutional claim brought by a former Defence Force soldier, ruling that her 2014 discharge on the grounds of “completion of engagement” was lawful, reasonable and did not breach her constitutional right to protection of the law.
In a written judgment delivered by Justice Joan Charles, the court found that the Defence Force acted within its statutory powers under the Defence Act when it discharged Jenna Jackson after her first term of service and declined to re-engage her, despite her claims of unfairness, illegality and a denial of natural justice.
Jackson, represented by attorney Ronald Simon, had challenged her discharge from the Defence Force on August 4, 2014, arguing that it was premature, irrational and unconstitutional. She sought declarations that the decision infringed her rights under Section 4(b) of the Constitution, reinstatement to the Defence Force, compensation for lost earnings and benefits, and damages.
The state, represented by attorneys Michelle Benjamin and Kristyn Lewis, instructed by Ronnelle Hinds and Victoria Armorer, opposed the claim.
In her judgment, Justice Charles held that re-engagement in the Defence Force is discretionary and not automatic. She said Jackson had no legitimate expectation of re-engagement and that the competent military authority was entitled to end her service upon completion of her engagement.
The judge reviewed evidence showing that Jackson, who enlisted in April 2006, had extended periods of sick leave and medical restrictions related to polycystic ovaries, a back injury and complications following childbirth. These restrictions, the court noted, prevented her from performing core military duties such as prolonged standing, physical training and night duty.
Justice Charles concluded that the Defence Force’s decision was neither irrational nor an improper exercise of discretion. “It is not for this court to substitute its own decision for that of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force,” she said, recognising the military’s responsibility to manage operational effectiveness and fitness standards.
“I bear in mind that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is a military organisation charged with the responsibility of managing its strength, troop assignments, and discipline in furtherance of its duty to protect the nation,” the judge said.
While acknowledging that the Defence Force did not issue a discharge certificate to Jackson at the time of her discharge, the judge found that she had access to alternative remedies, including a petition to the Defence Council and judicial review proceedings, and therefore failed to meet the high threshold required to establish a constitutional breach.
The court also rejected Jackson’s claim for damages, finding no infringement of her constitutional rights. Although Justice Charles observed that the Defence Force could have chosen to discharge Jackson on medical grounds, she held that its decision to rely on “completion of engagement” was lawful.
Jackson’s claim was dismissed, and in exercising her discretion on costs, Justice Charles ordered that each party bear its own legal costs.
THE Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the Chief of Defence Staff challenging a High Court decision that allowed a former soldier to pursue judicial review over the military’s refusal to roster him for duty after his discharge was ruled unlawful.
In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice of Appeal Nolan Bereaux, with Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh, the court held that the High Court judge was not “plainly wrong” to grant permission for judicial review, clearing the way for Devon Edwards’ claim to proceed.
The appellant, the Chief of Defence Staff, sought to overturn an order made by Justice Joan Charles on June 24, 2024, which refused to set aside leave granted to Edwards to challenge the defence force’s decision not to re-engage and roster him following a prior court ruling that declared his discharge illegal.
Edwards, a soldier in the defence force, was discharged in May 2014 under a “zero tolerance” policy after he was charged with criminal offences. In a separate constitutional action decided in June 2020, then-Justice James Aboud ruled that the policy, as applied to Edwards, was unlawful, ultra vires the Defence Force Act and in breach of several of his constitutional rights. Aboud awarded Edwards $15,000 in damages but made no order for reinstatement.
After the Chief of Defence Staff declined, by letter dated September 22, 2020, to roster Edwards for duty, Edwards sought judicial review to challenge that refusal. The defence chief argued that Edwards had failed to disclose material facts, had abused the court process and was barred because reinstatement had been considered and rejected in the earlier case.
In dismissing the appeal, Bereaux said the threshold for granting leave for judicial review is low and that such decisions should be overturned only sparingly. He found that Justice Charles was entitled to conclude that Edwards had an arguable case and had not breached his duty of candour.
“The issue of reinstatement was not sought as a substantive remedy nor finally determined” in the earlier constitutional proceedings, Bereaux said, adding that the discussion of reinstatement before Aboud arose only in the context of assessing damages.
The court also rejected claims of delay, noting that Edwards’ cause of action arose only after the defence chief formally refused to roster him following the 2020 ruling.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the Chief of Defence Staff was ordered to pay Edwards’ costs, to be assessed by the registrar if not agreed.
A High Court judge has ordered the state to pay more than $223,000 in damages, interest and costs to a sporting apparel wholesaler who was unlawfully detained and maliciously prosecuted by police officers during a traffic stop in 2018.
In a recent judgment, Justice Devindra Rampersad ruled that the claimant, who asked that his name not be revealed because of the prevailing crime situation, was falsely imprisoned and subjected to malicious prosecution after being stopped, detained and charged by officers of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, during a traffic exercise on the Churchill Roosevelt Highway on June 23, 2018.
He was represented at trial by attorney Joel Roper. In his order, Justice Rampersad awarded the claimant $50,000 in damages for false imprisonment, inclusive of aggravated damages, and $70,000 for malicious prosecution. An additional $25,000 was awarded as special damages.
The court also granted interest on the awards. Justice Rampersad declined to award exemplary damages, stating that no further damages were warranted under that head. The defendant was also ordered to pay the claimant’s prescribed legal costs, quantified at $34,410.41.
According to the statement of case, the claimant, a wholesaler and retailer of sporting apparel, was stopped by police shortly after 10.30 am while driving to make business deliveries and photograph a wedding. He was initially ticketed for speeding and tinted windows before being stopped again minutes later, forcibly removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, searched and taken to the Cumuto Police Station.
His claim contended he was detained for approximately eight hours without being informed of the reasons for his arrest or advised of his constitutional rights, including access to an attorney or a telephone call. He was later charged with exceeding the speed limit, driving with a heavily tinted window, and using insulting language. A magistrate subsequently dismissed the charge of using insulting language.
THE JUDICIARY has released detailed information on outstanding judgments and decisions of High Court and Court of Appeal judicial officers in response to a freedom of information request from a transparency advocate in November.
On November 25, attorneys for Anthony Dopson, a civic activist and former Oilfields Workers’ Trade Union branch secretary, demanded the release of detailed records on long-standing court judgments.
The FOIA request, sent by Freedom Law Chambers, was addressed to Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh.
The firm, led by Anand Ramlogan, SC, argued that delays eroded trust in the Judiciary and violated the constitutional promise of timely justice. The request gave the Chief Justice until December 25 to issue a decision.
A letter accompanying the request noted a national concern about judicial backlogs, questioning whether judicial resources are being efficiently managed.
“Given that the Judiciary is constitutionally mandated to uphold the rule of law and ensure access to justice, prolonged delays undermine its constitutional role and impair public confidence in this critical institution. These matters are plainly of national concern.
“They affect citizens’ constitutional right of access to justice, the efficiency of a core branch of the State, and the credibility of the judicial system,” attorney Aasha Ramlal wrote.
The FOIA request sought a list of all matters in which High Court judges, masters, registrars and Court of Appeal judges have reserved judgments for more than six months; all matters where decisions on applications or costs have remained outstanding beyond three months; all statements of costs filed but unassessed after one year, with the assigned registrar identified; all pending appeals where written reasons remain outstanding more than six months after the notice of appeal; the number of decisions of each High Court judge that have been reversed by the Court of Appeal over the past five years.
CJ COMMITTED TO TRANSPARENCY
In its response, the Judiciary’s disclosure covered judges of the Court of Appeal, the High Court, masters, and registrars, providing data as of November 25.
It also provided a list of reserved judgments outstanding for over six months; outstanding decisions on costs; statements of costs filed but not yet assessed; outstanding reasons for appeals over six months; and appeals filed where High Court decisions were overturned by the Court of Appeal in the past five years.
In the statement, the Office of the Chief Justice emphasised the Judiciary’s commitment to public accountability and transparency.
It said the information was compiled primarily from judicial officers’ own reporting, with registrars reviewing hundreds of Court of Appeal orders dating back to 2020. It also said the information was being simultaneously disclosed to the media “in acknowledgement of its duties of accountability to the public and transparency in its operations.”
The statement added, “The information we have provided is based largely on the reporting of the judicial officers themselves. The Judiciary understands the importance of maintaining accurate records and tracking the progress of cases in which decisions are pending, and we will continue to update our records as new monitoring systems are implemented.”
The Judiciary noted that while there are no statutory timelines for the delivery of judgments in Trinidad and Tobago, six months is generally considered a reasonable benchmark. Oral judgments are often delivered within this period, although decisions from higher courts, including the Privy Council, can take longer.
Highlighting the principles guiding judicial conduct, the statement cited the Statements of Principles and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, which instruct judges to dispose of court business “efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.” It noted that factors such as case complexity, workload, or health issues can affect timelines.
“The Judiciary recognises that one of its core functions is to ensure that judgments and decisions are provided ‘with reasonable promptness’ and that adequate reasons are given in the event of an appeal.
“Most judicial officers monitor their performance to ensure compliance with their obligations.
“Most judicial officers also work diligently, striving to hear and dispose of cases fairly and within a reasonable time. At times, however, judicial officers, like everyone else, undergo health and other challenges which impact their efficiency.”
To support the timely delivery of judgments, the Judiciary outlined ongoing initiatives to facilitate general compliance. These include: continued training on oral and written judgments; monitoring judicial performance by officers and the Office of the Chief Justice; mentoring and advising newer judicial officers; strengthening systems for tracking judicial performance; public reporting on judicial activity; and encouraging timely submissions from attorneys to facilitate prompt decisions.
Judiciary apologises
The statement acknowledged that some court users have experienced delays and offered a sincere apology, committing to delivering outstanding judgments as quickly as possible.
“We acknowledge that some court users have had to wait a long time for judgments and decisions to be given.
“For this, the Judiciary sincerely apologises. We commit to doing all that is humanly possible to ensure that these outstanding judgments will be delivered in the shortest possible time. We will also work diligently to deliver reserved judgments and decisions within a reasonable time as we move forward.
“We ask for the understanding of the public as we strive to fulfil our mandate within the existing constraints of resources.” The Judiciary said the disclosure reflected its dedication to ensuring timely justice.
“It is also a recognition of our duty to be accountable to the public to enhance trust and confidence in the judicial system.”
In the letter, Dopson’s attorneys noted, “The Judiciary is one of the three constitutional branches of government. Its operations must be transparent to ensure public confidence. Delayed judgments, particularly those delayed beyond the accepted six-month standard, affect the credibility of the institution.
The Hall of Justice, Port of Spain. – File photo
“Disclosure will allow the public to understand the extent of systemic delays and whether corrective measures are needed. Judicial officers, while constitutionally independent, are still accountable to the public for the performance of their duties. Timely judgment delivery is a core judicial responsibility. Transparency in this regard facilitates informed discourse on judicial efficiency, resource allocation, and administrative reform,” the letter said.
It also stated that Dopson intended to publish any information received “so that members of the public, attorneys and litigants can identify whether cases have been omitted and press for accuracy.
“This way, judges can be assisted by litigants and attorneys whose matters were inadvertently omitted to ensure that they have a complete list of outstanding judgments,” the letter said.
What the records show
The Judiciary disclosed detailed records showing which judges and masters have cleared long-outstanding decisions and which matters remain pending across the High Court, Family and Children Division and Court of Appeal.
In the High Court’s civil division, several judicial officers reported having no decisions reserved for more than six months. Those in full compliance include Justices Carol Gobin, Frank Seepersad and Margaret Mohammed, along with Masters Sherlanne Pierre, Coreen Findley, Rishma Ramrattan, Wrenerson Lochan and Antoinette Alleyne.
Records also show a list of outstanding civil matters before other judges, involving civil trials, interim applications and constitutional cases. Some date back several years, with reasons cited including delayed submissions, complex legal issues, transcript preparation and intervening circumstances such as the death of court staff or litigants. Delivery dates for many of these rulings are scheduled between December and mid-2026.
Judges with outstanding civil matters include Justices Joan Charles, Devindra Rampersad, Robin Mohammed, Nadia Kangaloo, Marcia Ayers-Caesar, Kevin Ramcharan, Avason Quinlan-Williams, Jacqueline Wilson, Karen Reid, Christopher Sieuchand, Westmin James and Marissa Robertson. In some cases, judgments have been drafted and await formal delivery, while in others oral decisions were given but written reasons remain pending.
In the criminal division, 13 judges reported no outstanding decisions or judgments, including Justices Devan Rampersad, Hayden St. Clair-Douglas, Kathy Ann Waterman Latchoo, Lisa Ramsumair-Hinds, Gail Gonzales, Nalini Singh, George Busby, Mauriceia Joseph, Gillian Scotland, Sherene Murray-Bailey and Tricia Hudlin-Cooper, as well as acting judges Maria Busby-Earle-Caddle and Trevor Jones.
Several masters in the criminal division also reported full compliance. A small number of matters involving reasons pending appeal remain under the supervision of Master Sarah De Silva.
Most cases cleared in Family & Children Division
The Judiciary’s update on the Family and Children Division shows that a significant number of judges and masters have cleared all matters reserved for more than six months before Nov. 25, 2025.
Family Court judges with no outstanding matters include Justices Sharon Gibson, Halcyon Yorke-Young and Linda Khan. Numerous family court masters and children court judges and masters also reported no pending decisions.
Outstanding matters were identified for a limited number of judges. Justice Joseph Tam, a temporary judge, reported several reserved decisions, some dating back years. Justice Betsy Ann Lambert-Peterson reported 19 outstanding decisions, along with pending costs rulings and appeal reasons, some originating from the Civil Division. Other judges reported one or two pending matters, most with delivery dates set between December 2025 and January 2026. The Judiciary also released an updated schedule of reserved judgments before the Court of Appeal that have been outstanding for six months or more, listing more than 60 matters across civil, criminal, family, magisterial and procedural appeals.
Some civil appeals date back to 2013, with several high-profile cases involving the Attorney General, state agencies, media houses, trade unions and former public officials. While a number of judgments were delivered in December 2025 or are scheduled for early 2026, dozens remain pending, including criminal and AJIPA appeals reserved between mid-2024 and April 2025.
Data cataloguing hundreds of High Court and tribunal decisions that were set aside, varied or remitted by the Court of Appeal between 2012 and 2025, were provided. The cases span constitutional, commercial, labour, immigration, family and public law matters, with many remitted for rehearing or reconsideration.
A 59-YEAR-OLD Moruga man appeared before a High Court Master on Christmas Eve, charged with the manslaughter of his relative Brian Figaro.
Servulus Figaro, also of Moruga, stood before Master Gray in the South Criminal Court “D” on December 24. He was not called on to enter a plea as the matter was adjourned to January 27.
According to reports, Brian Figaro was involved in a heated argument with a relative on December 8. During the altercation, Figaro was allegedly struck several times with a baton, sustaining serious injuries to his head and abdomen.
Three days later, on December 11, Figaro collapsed at his home. He was rushed to the Princes Town District Health Facility, where he was pronounced dead.
Following advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on December 23, Servulus Figaro was arrested and charged.
In a separate incident a 26-year-old Petit Bourg man has been remanded into custody after appearing in court charged with the murder of Mickel Browne.
Dylan Collette of Jackson Street, appeared before Master Indira Chinebas on December 24. In addition to murder, Collette faces charges of possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition and common assault.
The charges stem from an incident on December 5, when 31-year-old Browne of Champ Fleurs, was at a bar in San Juan lining with a group of people. Reports say a gunman approached the group, pointed a weapon at Browne and fired several times before fleeing the scene.
Browne was taken to hospital but later succumbed to his injuries. Collette reportedly surrendered to officers at the Homicide Bureau of Investigations (HBI) Region II on December 19. He is expected to return to court on January 7.
A PRINCES TOWN couple who killed the woman’s previous abusive boyfriend have been sentenced to a total of 29 years for their roles in the businessman’s murder.
Dwayne Baldeo and Renee Mohammed were sentenced by Justice Mauricia Joseph-Patrick in the San Fernando High Court for the October 28, 2020, murder of Christopher Hosein.
Hosein, 45, a businessman, who resigned from the Fire Service about ten years ago, lived at St James Street in Princes Town. There, he ran his business, Expert Fire and Safety Ltd. A farmer found his burnt body near his burnt Kia Sorento in a gravel road off the M1 Tasker Road in the Ste Madeleine police district. A yellow rope was tied around Hosein’s neck, his hands were bound, and his eyes were covered with duct tape.
Police investigations quickly focused on Baldeo and Mohammed after CCTV footage, witness accounts, and forensic evidence linked them to Hosein’s apartment. A white Toyota Fielder wagon driven by Baldeo was intercepted later that day, and items belonging to the deceased were recovered. A post-mortem examination determined that Hosein died from a combination of asphyxia, inhalation of soot, burns, and blunt force trauma to the head.
Baldeo and Mohammed both pleaded guilty to murder on the basis of felony murder under a plea agreement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The agreement followed their indictment on June 18, 2024, for Hosein’s murder of Hosein. In sentencing the two, Justice Joseph-Patrick adopted a starting point of 33 years’ imprisonment for both. Baldeo benefited from a downward adjustment of three years for his conduct while incarcerated. A further one-third reduction was applied for his guilty plea, amounting to ten years. After also taking into account time already spent on remand of almost five years, Joseph-Patrick imposed a final sentence of a little over 15 years’ imprisonment.
Baldeo was represented by Rajiv Persad, SC, and Ajesh Summesar.
Dwayne Baldeo. – Photo courtesy TTPS
Mohammed’s starting point was also reduced by three years for remorse and positive conduct in prison. An additional one-year reduction was granted in light of her background, personal history, and immaturity at the time of the offence. She was 23 at the time. A further one-third reduction for her guilty plea, amounting to nine years and eight months,was applied. After credit for time spent in custody, Mohammed received a final sentence of slightly over 14 years’ imprisonment.
She was represented by attorneys Michelle Ali and Kameika Peters of the Public Defenders’ Department.
In an affidavit placed before the court, Mohammed described a deeply troubled personal history, including childhood sexual abuse and a turbulent, on-and-off relationship with Hosein. She said aspects of that relationship caused past trauma to resurface and contributed to her emotional state at the time.
Mohammed admitted she and Baldeo were also in a tumultuous relationship. He helped her and her mother financially and with errands. She said it was never her intuition to lead him on, but she now realises she was wrong for entertaining his advances. She detailed incidents in which she alleged he had previously assaulted her, leading to serious injuries and extended hospitalisation.
According to Mohammed, after her release from hospital she moved in with Hosein due to her physical condition and financial dependence. She said she also suffered abuse by Hosein while recovering from her injuries.
She claimed that she later disclosed her experiences to Baldeo, who offered to “rough up” Hosein. She admitted accepting that offer and helping to plan the encounter, but maintained that she did not intend or expect Hosein to die.
“I understand that I was a party in the act that caused the deceased to die,” Mohammed stated, “but I had no intention or knowledge that he was going to die.”
She described the past five years in custody as “a nightmare” and expressed remorse for her actions.
THREE decades after he and another man murdered two women in Westmoorings, convicted killer Chuck Attin has had 22 years, nine months and 15 days tacked on to his sentence for the rape of one of the women’s maids.
The High Court sentenced Attin, also known as Clint Pierre, to more than 22 years in prison for rape after he pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences dating back to 1994, when he murdered Candace Scott, 23, and Karen Sa Gomes, 31.
Justice Kathy Ann Waterman-Latchoo imposed a sentence of 26 years and eight months’ imprisonment with hard labour on the rape charge, with credit given for three years, ten months, and five days already served. This results in a remaining sentence of 22 years, nine months and 25 days.
Attin also received sentences of one year and four months each for serious indecency and buggery. However, both of those sentences were fully extinguished after the court credited him with time already served. The sentences took effect from December 12.
Attin is already serving time, at the court’s pleasure, for Scott and Sa Gomes’s murders, as he was one of the youngest murderers convicted, at just 15, in 1997.
Attin, formerly of Nile Street, Cocorite, was initially sentenced by Justice Lionel Jones to be detained at the State’s pleasure, but this was later challenged in a constitutional motion, and the law was changed so that child murderers, who cannot face the death penalty because of their age, would be detained at the court’s pleasure, with periodic reviews.
In 2004, then Justice Herbert Volney sentenced Attin to a minimum of 25 years, after which he would return to court for a review of his sentence.
Volney’s ruling was partly upheld by the Court of Appeal, which ruled the 25-year punitive element of the sentence was not excessive, having regard to the brutality of the case, but that the sentence should come up for review before expiration of the term.
Attin’s last review was in March 2023, when High Court judge Hayden St Clair-Douglas held that his detention should continue.
In October, Attin pleaded guilty to the rape, serious indecency and buggery charges and was sentenced by Justice Waterman-Latchoo, after he accepted a maximum sentence indication (MSI) given by the judge of 28 years.
At his sentencing hearing, Attin’s attorney, Michelle Ali, of the Public Defenders’ Department, argued that due to the state’s delay in filing the indictment for rape in October 1996, the court should consider applying a discount while deducting the time spent in custody since 1994, when he was arrested for the murders.
Waterman-Latchoo did not agree.
She also did not agree that the sentences should run concurrently, ordering that they run consecutively since, had he been sentenced in 1996, they would have been consecutive sentences.
Another man, Noel Seepersad, was also convicted of killing the women and sentenced to hang. He appealed his conviction, but his petition to the Privy Council for special leave was dismissed.
According to the facts involving the rape and other sexual offences charges, on the morning of July 11, 1994, the Scotts’ maid arrived at the home of her employers, Johnathon and Candace Scott, at Anchor Drive, Westmoorings.
Later that morning, Candace Scott left the house with her daughter, leaving the worker alone with the Scotts’ infant son.
Shortly before midday, two men arrived at the property claiming they were there to carry out painting work. After initially turning them away, when Johnathon Scott said he knew nothing about a painting job, the maid was later confronted inside the house.
According to court evidence, the men threatened to kill her, and she was ordered to take the baby upstairs, which she did.
While Seepersad ransacked the Scotts’ master bedroom, Attin forced the maid to kiss him before sexually assaulting her. Attin then got angry after he found out she lied about her name, and hit her with a chopper. He threatened to kill the child when he began to cry.
During the ordeal, the maid was allowed to bathe the baby, but while doing so, Attin cut off her underwear with a Chinese chopper. Moments later, he raped her while threatening her. She was also forced to perform oral sex on Seepersad.
During the ordeal, the victim was raped and buggered several times by both men.
When Candace Scott returned home in the afternoon, she was ambushed. A family friend, Karen Sa Gomes, also arrived and was similarly confronted. Police later discovered Scott and Sa Gomes’s bodies in separate rooms of the house.
Emergency calls were made later that day, and officers from the Four Roads Police Station responded. The maid was taken to the police station and then to a health facility, where forensic examinations were conducted.
Subsequent analysis confirmed the presence of biological evidence, and investigators recovered fingerprint evidence at the scene. Police processing of the crime scene continued in the days that followed, and Attin was identified by the maid in an identification parade, and Seepersad was seen driving Sa Gomes’s car on the same day with Attin as a passenger.
A HIGH COURT JUDGE has dismissed an application by Cepep Company Ltd seeking summary judgment or to strike out a breach-of-contract claim brought by a contractor, ruling that the dispute raises triable issues suitable for a full trial.
Justice Robin Mohammed held that Tombo and Company Ltd has a realistic prospect of success in its claim arising from the early termination of a three-year services contract.
The decision arose from an amended application filed by Cepep on May 7, 2021, seeking summary judgment or to strike out Tombo’s claim and statement of case.
Tombo filed its original claim on October 30, 2020, alleging that Cepep breached a written contract entered into on November 1, 2019, under which Tombo agreed to provide environmental protection, enhancement, waste removal, and disposal services for a period of three years, ending on November 10, 2022.
The company contended that Cepep unlawfully terminated the agreement by letter dated March 3, 2020, without explanation or prior performance evaluations required under the contract.
In its claim, Tombo sought damages for breach of contract, reinstatement of the agreement, and a declaration that a termination clause allowing notice without cause was unfair and unreasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act. Alternatively, the company claimed $1.815 million in alleged lost earnings, along with interest and costs.
In its application, Cepep argued that it was contractually entitled to terminate the agreement and that the Unfair Contract Terms Act did not apply. The state company also maintained that the matter involved contractual interpretation and that Tombo had no realistic prospect of succeeding at trial.
In refusing the application, Mohammed found that Cepep had admitted it did not conduct biannual performance evaluations contemplated by the contract and that there was a genuine dispute over whether key contractual clauses should be read together. He also noted unresolved issues concerning alleged nonpayment for services and the impact of the termination on Tombo’s operations.
“These matters raise triable issues,” the judge said in his ruling, concluding that the claim disclosed sufficient grounds to proceed and was not an abuse of process.
The court dismissed Cepep’s application in its entirety and ordered it to pay Tombo’s costs to be assessed if not agreed. Mohammed also directed that a case management conference be held on February 2, 2026.
Tombo was represented by Jeevan Rampersad and Stephen Boodram, while Christopher George and Anuradha Sitala Dean represented Cepep.
A policeman assigned to a specialised unit of the TTPS and a civilian – both charged with gun-related offences stemming from a December 10 incident aboard a pirogue on the Caroni River –will not face the High Court after prosecutors instead recommended a summary trial for both men.
As a result, PC Kushal Karamthesingh of the Anti-Extortion Unit and civilian Ramjit Ramlochan will have their matters heard in the magistrates court.
At a hearing on December 18, the police prosecutor informed Master Rhea Libert of the state’s recommendation for summary trial. Libert subsequently transferred the matter and Karamthesingh and Ramlochan are expected to appear before a magistrate on January 21.
During Thursday’s hearing, Karamthesingh’s attorney Terry Boyer requested specific disclosure of body-worn camera footage from officers of the Multi-Option Police Section of the Special Branch, who carried out the arrests. He also sought disclosure of drone footage.
The two first appeared before the court on December 17 after being charged on December 14.
Karamthesingh faces multiple charges, including transferring his Glock 48 pistol, transferring ten rounds of 9mm ammunition, possession of three 12-gauge cartridges, failing to have his Firearm User’s Licence while carrying firearms and ammunition in a public place, improper use of a TTPS-issued shotgun, and being unauthorised to keep the shotgun and five TTPS-issued 12-gauge cartridges.
Ramlochan is charged with possession of Karamthesingh’s Glock 48 pistol and ammunition. Karamthesingh and Ramlochan are on $175,000 and $120,000 bail, respectively.
Police alleged that around 11 pm on December 10, officers from the Multi-Option Police Section – a unit that was also involved in a multi-million-dollar drug seizure three hours later in the Caroni Swamp – were conducting an operation alongside officers from the Coastal and Riverine Patrol Unit to intercept a pirogue suspected of transporting narcotics.
According to investigators, officers observed a pirogue carrying four men and attempted to engage it. One of the men allegedly identified himself as a policeman and told officers he was hunting capybara.
During the hearing on December 18, police prosecutor Shala Julien said the state intended for both matters to be kept together. Attorneys David Carter and Vishal Persad represent Ramlochan.
THE Court of Appeal has upheld a ruling of the High Court in favour of former member of the Industrial Court Sam Maharaj, who was awarded more than $3 million in compensation for distress, inconvenience and pecuniary loss over the refusal of the Patrick Manning cabinet to renew his contract in 2000.
Justices of Appeal Gillian Lucky, Mira Dean-Armourer and Carla Brown-Antoine dismissed the appeal filed by the State against a 2019 ruling of Justice Frank Seepersad. A cross-appeal filed by Maharaj was also dismissed.
In a written decision in February 2019, in which he called for a review of the way appointments and re-appointments are made to that court, Seepersad ordered compensation for Maharaj of $3.17 million.
In December 2016, five months after Manning’s death, the London-based Privy Council delivered a ruling in favour of Maharaj, a former general secretary of the All Trinidad Sugar and General Workers Trade Union, and sent his case back to the High Court to determine compensation.
In 2000, the then-labour minister was reported to have told cabinet that Maharaj could neither “write, read nor speak properly and was not suited to be a member of the Industrial Court.” The cabinet, acting on this representation, declined to reappoint Maharaj.
The Court of Appeal, in December 2014, ruled in Maharaj’s favour, but no compensation was awarded.
Maharaj first brought the judicial-review action in January 2004. He was represented by Senior Counsel Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj and Nyala Badal.
