US interest in Trinidad and Tobago: Energy, strategy, occupation risk

THE EDITOR: Talk of great-power land grabs was revived when US President Donald Trump reportedly expressed interest in buying Greenland. Less discussed – but equally unsettling to some here – is the prospect that the US might seek a more physical, controlling presence in TT for reasons that are both economic and strategic.

At the centre of the concern is gas. Venezuela sits atop one of the world’s largest natural gas reserves but lacks the domestic processing capacity to commercialise much of it. Nearby TT, by contrast, hosts Atlantic LNG and the nearest large-scale liquefaction and processing infrastructure. The practical reality is simple: Venezuelan gas needs processing facilities, and Trinidad offers them.

That dependence creates leverage. To some, that may not be a bad thing, as significant financial benefits will accrue – probably more than we have ever seen before. The question to others would be: At what price and what would be really be giving up as a sovereign nation?

It is no secret that US policymakers prize secure energy access and strategic chokepoints. Observers here note that Washington was reportedly not enthusiastic about TT signing the so-called Dragon deal – a move many interpreted as warming to non-Western partners – precisely when US plans toward Venezuela were in flux. If the US anticipated increased activity around Venezuela, securing proximate gas-processing facilities would have been a logical consideration.

Beyond hydrocarbons, geography matters. TT sits at the southern entrance to the Caribbean – a strategic gateway between South America and the islands. The US already treats the maritime approaches in our region as routine transit routes for narcotics from Venezuela and Colombia. To those who view drug trafficking as a border-security threat, a permanent or expanded US presence here could be argued as an extension of that rationale – a Caribbean parallel to the Greenland episode, reframed as counter-narcotics and border protection.

History offers mixed signals. Two decades ago, Caribbean states embraced Venezuela’s Petrocaribe initiative under Hugo Chávez, reducing purchases from TT and underscoring that regional solidarity often yields to immediate national interests. That episode illustrates why Caricom’s recent objections to US movements in regional waters ring hollow to some: real Caribbean unity has frequently been transactional.

Yet, that transactionalism is a double-edged sword. Trinidad now stands relatively isolated – a lone island with critical infrastructure that could be pivotal to US plans. If Washington decides the best way to secure gas supplies or stop drug flows is a stronger, more physical foothold, the island’s vulnerability would be acute.

For critics, the remedy is clear: reinforce sovereignty, diversify diplomatic and commercial partners, and strengthen regional institutions beyond rhetoric. For others, pragmatic accommodation with a major power is unavoidable.

Whatever the path chosen, the debate underscores a bitter truth: when a neighbour’s house is burning, you first wet your own. For TT, wetting its own house means deciding whether it will guard its sovereignty or cede useful pieces of it in the name of security and commerce.

ARNOLD CORNEAL

St Joseph