What Williams had in mind for BWIA

PART V

Premier Eric Williams continued to lobby the other premiers of the unit governments of the British West Indies to participate in the ownership and operations of BWIA. Jamaica and Barbados appeared not to be interested. British Guyana’s Forbes Burnham stated that he was interested, but did not have the money to invest.

Williams’ statement to the House of Representatives on March 23, 1962 is published below:

“Moreover, BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation) was prepared to consider, subject to terms, investment of up to 10 per cent issued share capital of BWIA. This information was communicated to the UK government, the federal government, and the unit governments of the Federation, governments of British Guiana, British Honduras and Bermuda.

"Further discussions took place in London with BOAC on certain conditions, agreement on which was necessary before the BOAC takeover of BWIA. The conditions included pooling, aircraft charter agreements between the BOAC and BWIA, and an assurance for BOAC to use their good offices to continue the BWIA designation on Atlantic and other routes.

"On October 27, 1961, the government of Jamaica and all federal governments and administrators as well as the governors of British Guiana and British Honduras were advised that the formal handing over ceremony would take place on November 1, 1961, and that the government of Trinidad and Tobago (TT) cordially invited each government to send a representative. The formal handing over ceremony by BOAC took place on November 1, 1961 at 4 pm with BOAC being represented by Lord Tweedsmuir and K Granville.

"On December 5, 1961, ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) was approached for assistance in obtaining a consultant to advise on technical administration, on the suitability of the present aircraft being used, and operations in the servicing of all routes covered: inter-island and trans-Atlantic. The ICAO consultant, Mr Brancker arrived in Trinidad on January 2 and submitted a report on January 26, 1962. This report was made on the basis of discussions with unit territories as regards their participation in the management of BWIA. The following extracts from Mr Brancker’s report are of general interest:

'The government of Trinidad and Tobago has already made reasonable offers to the other unit territories to share in the operations of BWIA, and if these offers are accepted and BWIA is designated as the official carrier of each unit (in the bilateral agreement sense), order will be preserved and BWIA can survive and prosper. This can be done regardless of political circumstances as exemplified in Malaya.

'If BWIA is to be preserved, therefore, it is imperative that Her Majesty's government should do everything possible to ensure that the presently British Colonial territories support a single airline-BWIA.

'I appreciate that it is impossible for Her Majesty's government to dictate policy to territories which are either independent or shortly to become so, but efforts can at least be made in this direction, and approaches by United Kingdom operators can be curbed until BWIA has had a chance to put forward its own proposals.

'I must also point out that at the present moment, as far as services to the United States are concerned, which as will be shown later, are vital to BWIA, the designation of BWIA as the operator in the bilateral agreement has been done by Her Majesty’s government, and as long as Trinidad is officially a colony, this designation can be revoked and another operator can be named.

'The position after independence will be complex, and in due course, fresh bilateral agreements will need to be negotiated by each territory, but, in the normal course of events, temporary operating permits are issued by the parties involved to continue existing services until new arrangements can be made. It may be worth pointing out that, if the currently British colonial territories in the Caribbean could negotiate collectively with outsiders, they could make a very much better deal than they could hope to achieve independently.

"That is the end of my present quotation from the report of Mr Brancker. I continue with my statement.

The offer made to unit governments is as follows:-

(a) Share participation to such an extent as may reasonably be desired at the same price per share as the government of TT paid to BOAC, but with the facility of spreading payment therefore over a period, if required, of (say) three to five years.

(b) In the event of acceptance, representation on the board.

(c) Unit governments will not be expected to make any commitment for further capital expenditures or to accept liability for any operating deficits which may result during any of the first five years. This period of five years is fixed since it is confidently anticipated that, given the opportunity to exploit the combined rights of the region, BWIA will be viable within that time. Such operating deficits as the government of TT may pay will, of course, be recouped from profits upon the company attaining viability.

"It is possible that some doubt may exist as to whether, with the impending dissolution of the Federation and the approach of various units of the West Indian territories to independence, it would be possible to operate a regional carrier as a joint undertaking.

"On this point there are precedents in various parts of the world such as, for example, the Malayan Airways Ltd Airlines which came into being in May 1957 when it became a public liability company and when the governments of Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories became shareholders.

"Another example of this kind of venture is the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) which is a joint undertaking set up to exploit with maximum efficiency and economy the combined rights of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, under the several air services agreements. Both of the undertakings mentioned above have proved to be eminently successful in their purpose, despite the constitutional independence of the participating territories.

"The government of TT considers that, given the opportunity to exploit the combined rights of the region, and the full and active participation of West Indian governments, an airline service such as this which is vital to the needs of the territories should prove to be a successful commercial venture. However, even if it should prove to be otherwise, the existence of a quick and easy method of communication between the far-flung units of the British West Indian islands, British Honduras, British Guiana, and Bermuda, with their community of interests and of heritage, will provide benefits which cannot be really measured in terms of dollars made or lost.