Dizzying Dragon diplomacy

THERE have been so many twists and turns in the Dragon gas saga that when the Office of the Prime Minister on September 30 announced, effectively, the resurrection of the project, which had been thought finished under the Donald Trump administration, it was at once surprising and unsurprising.

Soon after assuming office, the Prime Minister had described it as “dead.” The UNC had, in opposition, pilloried the PNM for cosying up to Nicolas Maduro and expressed open support for Juan Guaido. But step back, and a more nuanced picture emerges. Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in her first administration, had aggressively pushed for closer energy collaboration with Mr Maduro. Still, she cannot now boast of delivering “good news” to the country on Dragon without acknowledging the good intentions of her predecessors.

Dragon is “resurrected.” But – even putting aside whether Mr Maduro will return to the table given all the heated volleys recently exchanged between Port of Spain and Caracas over Mr Trump’s murky machinations at sea – one would have to be incredibly naive to see the likelihood of gas flowing any time soon as a sure bet. The project involves installing a 22 km pipeline. Key details have not been disclosed, but it is clear that it will take time.

Meanwhile, there are political risks originating, unusually, from the chaos of the White House.

Unpredictability and uncertainty characterise the Trump regime’s Venezuela policy. It was Mr Trump who, in a brief tweet, ended Dragon, worked on for almost ten years by the PNM. Yet, it is his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, who revives it. Separately, Stephen Miller, his deputy chief of staff, has reportedly played a leading role in relation to summary strikes on boats. Somewhere in the mix is Pete Hegseth, his secretary of defence, or war, who this week summoned 800 of America’s generals and admirals for a lecture. On Wednesday, the American government shut down.

To study recent events in this country’s diplomacy with the US is to detect a decidedly transactional air.

The about-turn by the Trump administration on Dragon came days after Ms Persad-Bissessar delivered at the UN General Assembly in New York a full-throated endorsement of Mr Trump. Telling is the caveat set out by Mr Rubio’s team as he announced US licence support: Dragon must not “provide significant benefit to the Maduro regime.” This condition, which faintly echoes a no-cash requirement under the Keith Rowley administration’s arrangement, suggests the deal is being used as a cudgel to heap more pressure on Mr Maduro. On regime change, and much else, the White House and Ms Persad-Bissessar agree.

If so, that would present us with the strange spectacle of a leader who sees all the dangerous faults of Mr Maduro and none of Mr Trump’s.