Tobago’s security challenges after 1793

DR RITA PEMBERTON

THE British reconquest of Tobago from the French on April 20, 1793 was a stimulant of both pride and problems, more so of the latter for it was not a resounding victory and there was an awareness that France was not accepting of this most recent bruise to its ego, so another attack was to be expected. It was also recognised that the island’s defence system needed strengthening to increase its ability to withstand any subsequent French attack. The Tobago administration passed a series of laws which reflected their concerns and intent but there were several complicating factors to be overcome.

Firstly, there was a continual movement of people entering the island for various purposes whose loyalty to the island could not be guaranteed. This led to the passage of the Act to regulate the conduct of people entering the island and to authorise the removal of non-conforming people and those suspected of treason or treasonable practices, plotting or endeavouring to disturb the peace, which was passed in August 1794 and because of the persistent threat was revived in August 1795.

By this law all military and civilian officers were required to assist in the apprehension of people with sinister motives who arrived on the island. New arrivals on the island were required to report either to the captains general or commander in chief at government house in Scarborough to submit their names, state the purpose of their visit while others who were suspected of treason or sedition motives – if found guilty – were required to leave the island.

To brace for the expected attack, attention was turned to the militia for which more elaborate arrangements, than previously existed were made. On January 12, 1795, an act to continue the life of the militia to remedy the weakness of the previous act and regulate the discipline, order and government of the island, sought to form a regiment on foot and corps of artillery regiment and establish a militia and corps of artillery in this island. All naturalised white males, free coloured and free negroes and those born on the island who were between the ages of 16 to 60 and were not yet in the militia were mandated to report to the commanding officer in their district within 30 days of the passing of the Act or be fined £5 for neglect. These troops, which were to be named after the capital and the parishes – Scarborough, St Andrew’s, St David’s, St George’s, St Patrick’s, St Mary’s, St Paul’s and St John’s company were to be placed under the command of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, ensign and major. The governor or commanding officer could determine the number of captains and gunners that were appropriate, and the officers were appointed by the governor.

Each company was required to meet once per month in each parish at nine o’clock. Lateness or absences were punishable at rates varying from £3, six shillings for captains, lieutenants and ensigns, £1, 13 shillings each non-commissioned officer, £1, four shillings and nine pence and each gunner and private 16 shillings and six pence. Those who absented themselves from two subsequent parades, would have to pay double the amount for the second offence and quadruple the amount for every subsequent offence. Because of location difficulties of distant estates, it was possible for appointees to attend parades closer to their location, except for those who were allocated for duty on the batteries. Each district was allocated a special day for parade rehearsal and must conform to the prescribed military dress. Each non-commissioned officer and private was required always to have at his place of abode the 36 rounds of Bill cartridges suited to his musket which were supplied to him, under penalty of 33 shillings for default. These cartridges must be produced at the parades when required.

For consideration of internal security, no plantation was to be left without “one proper and discreet white person thereon” and if there was only one white man on an estate, he shall attend the parade every two months with the prevailing penalties for absence. Captains were required to provide returns of attendance at parades which included the names and number of defaulters and amounts paid for defaulting

The need for manpower immediately raised the second major complication, that of the enslaved population which was manifested in the matter of the sizes of the different elements of the population. The white population was very small and that of the enslaved population considerably larger. The complication was not only size related for the reality was that a population that was in constant resistance mode against its oppressors was being used to join a fight in support of its enslavers against another group of enslavers with whom they also had recent experience.

The administrators, who were moved by necessity, recognised the irony of the situation, admitting that “it may be attended with bad consequences to entrust slaves arms and ammunition to be carried by them to and from parades at monthly and yearly meetings of the militias and from alarm posts where fatal accidents may happen on the places of parade…” which was casually explained as owing to “negligence or licentiousness of slaves.” Undoubtedly, in their minds were the opportunities that the disturbance of warfare coupled with the need to arm the enslaved population, offered to resistance activity.

The law stated that every non-commissioned officer and private of the regiment must carry his own artillery to and from parade on pain of penalty as for absences. Wartime regulations specified that on batteries, the ratio should be one negro to every white man and the small number of white men would be increased with addition of free coloured and free negroes who may serve in the corps of artillery. This would reduce the presence of enslaved people where their presence could potentially be most dangerous for the white population. However, it was considered useful to have the enslaved involved in the exercise therefore, commanding officers were authorised to call out from the plantations in the neighbourhood of the batteries “the most active, trusted and faithful slaves” at the rate of three per 100 and not more than four enslaved for each gun at the battery, to be trained in the exercise at the battery. Orders were made from neighbouring estates were to supply several enslaved, horses, mules, cattle or carriages; one enslaved was required for every 20 and one third part of animals and carriages were also required from the estate. The plantations would be paid six shillings for each draught horse, four shillings and five pence for each negro, three shillings for each mule, eight shillings for each yoke of cattle, ten shillings for each cart or carriage and five shillings per day for every negro carter. Plantation owners were required to provide the names of the enslaved who were selected for that purpose and were not to be substituted except in cases of medically certified illness, the selectees were to be replaced by people who were “equally intelligent and active.”

The law made provision for families of people who were killed on duty and planters would be compensated for all negroes, horses, mules, cattle and carriages that should be killed, maimed or damaged from public funds.

Martial law was to be proclaimed in the event of an invasion or information of intended invasion or insurrection. One “discreet” white person was always to be left on every plantation for security purposes. The population was to be informed of an emergency by the signal for an emergency: three guns firing every five minutes which was to be repeated at every battery on the island and in case of an alarm of an unexpected crisis a white man on a horse would inform his neighbour.

Martial law entailed the call out of half of the island’s trained force for 14 days at a time and the call out of a quota of enslaved from each plantation at the rate of one for every 50 of the plantation’s population and one animal for every 29, which are required to work on trenches, barricades or any public work necessary for immediate defence of the island. Numbers were to be equally proportioned among the plantations. Non-compliant plantation owners would be Court-martialed.

Protection at sea would only be offered to non-British masters, mariners and officers of non-British ships in the bays or harbours who were required to go to forts or batteries which were built for the protection of vessels lying there.

The third challenge for the administration was the presence of a resident French population on the island some of whom saw themselves as loyalist republicans and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the British monarch. They were considered a source of trouble and a challenge to the peace and safety of the island. Fearing for the possibility of their use as a foothold for the French forces and stimulants of activities against the British, an act was passed on January 20, 1795 which declared that all French and other inhabitants who refused to take the oath of allegiance and those who remained on the island after British capture on April 15, 1793 or who were resident there before the outbreak of hostilities and were summoned to take the oath and failed to attend were considered prisoners of war while hostilities persisted. Meanwhile, the French continued to organise another attempt to retake Tobago and the British continued with attempting to boost Tobago’s military strength right up to the end of the 18th century only to face another defeat by the French in 1802.