Anand Ramlogan: Travesty that PNM tried to hide NiQuan report

Former attorney general Anand Ramlogan, in a statement on June 18, welcomed the laying of the report into the NiQuan explosion in 2023 which claimed the life of a worker, in the House of Representatives.

"It is a travesty of justice that the PNM administration chose to hide it and a young widow had to sue in order to get it after several public statements that it will be disclosed upon completion of the investigation," Ramlogan said in a media statement.

"Stuart Young’s statement that NiQuan objected to this report being disclosed and hence the reason he denied access to this report is disingenuous and hollow."

Ramlogan said Young had not needed NiQuan’s nod to do the right thing.

"What did he expect them to say? 'Yes' to a report that would explode the flaws and negligence? A young man lost his life in circumstances that raised serious concerns about the poor health and safety protocols at NiQuan."

Ramlogan said a public perception that the PNM was protecting NiQuan had left an indelible mark and was consistent with protecting the rich and powerful to the detriment of the poor.

"A struggling mother of two young children was forced into a legal battle for justice against a minister who lacked compassion and courage to do the right thing. We look forward to receiving this report so that we can sue NiQuan for negligence as it was insured at the material time."

Ramlogan alleged Young had promised to disclose this report but then back-pedalled when the public outrage died down.

"We commend (Energy Minister) Dr Moonilal and the government for its commitment to transparency and accountability by making full and frank disclosure of this long awaited and much-hidden report."

EXCERPTS OF REPORT

The report's executive summary said before the accident the plant was not meeting expectations in terms of the rates and quality of product, amid instability in a part called the fractionating column.

Two experts were brought in but in it is unknown if they saw the plant working at full capacity or helped draft the management of change (MOC) documents to modify the plant.

To create a by-pass, a line was being purged of hydrocarbons using nitrogen gas, to be followed by steaming to remove any wax build-up. A fire occurred.

While helping to carry out these changes, Allenlane Ramkissoon suffered burns in a fire. Staff put out the fire, amid an unsuccessful call to the fire services due to a phone being out of service.

Ramkissoon was on the third tier and came down to the second but due to the fire could not then reach a ladder but had to jump down to the first tier for an operator to catch him.

"He did so and upon jumping, both Mr Ramkissoon and the operator fell on the grating. The operator then lowered Mr Ramkissoon, who had a limp and cut to his head, down the ladder of the first tier to the ground level of the skid, where the other Massy Energy Engineering Solutions personnel received him.

"The two Delron Emergency Rescue Technicians, who were stationed on the compound came with a spinal board and with assistance from the other personnel, placed Mr Ramkissoon on the

board, immobilized his head and carried him to the front of the permit office, where the Delron team performed a preliminary medical evaluation."

With the accident occurring at 12.55 am, at 1.05 am, a call was placed to Acropolis Medical Center requesting an ambulance which arrived at 2 am after reported technical difficulties and took Ramkissoon and his supervisor to Southern Medical Clinic.

On June 16, Ramkissoon and his wife were medevaced to Colombia for medical treatment, as decided by the Massy Energy management team, but on June 18 the company was notified of his passing in Colombia.

The report identified the accident's root causes as a lack of knowledge; skill; leadership/supervision; engineering of facility process/equipment/safety devices; maintenance; and standards: plus physical or mental stress.

The report urged a further probe to determine, "Why did management proceed given the risks identified/not identified by previous incidents, why was there not a safety culture in place that empowers workers to stop work, and why was the design of the system inadequate?