Reassessing government-led urban development

THE EDITOR: The announcement of a $45 million mall to be built at Independence Square, Port of Spain, designed to house just 22 micro and small businesses at a rent of $500 per month has generated much fanfare, but also raises serious questions about its long-term viability and fiscal rationale.

While presented as a symbol of economic empowerment and urban renewal, the maths reveals an annual revenue of $528,000, meaning the investment will take over 85 years to break even, not including maintenance, inflation, or operational costs.

Unfortunately for TT, this is just another financial risk at a time we cannot afford. It also is a reflection of a broader pattern of government intervention in urban spaces that has often proven unsustainable not just in TT, but across the globe.

Governments across the world have attempted similar ventures with mixed results. In the US, numerous city-owned malls from the 1960s to the 1980s, especially in downtown cores similar to Independence Square, have failed and become derelict.

Notably, Baltimore’s once-heralded Harborplace and the St Louis Centre collapsed under the weight of poor management, limited flexibility, and misalignment with consumer trends.

In South Africa, the government-led Gauteng SMME hub in Soweto struggled with low foot traffic, poor business support, and heavy maintenance costs, eventually requiring private-sector intervention to remain viable.

Even more worrying for the planned shopping complex is the narrative of “incubation” for small businesses without clearly defined support mechanisms to help them transition into a competitive market. Rental subsidies without complementary access to capital, mentorship, digital tools, or regulatory ease simply delay the inevitability of failure once state support is withdrawn.

On the other hand, there are success stories of public-private urban renewal. Melbourne’s Queen Victoria Market revitalisation was successful due to city ownership, but with private sector operational management and robust integration with urban transport, tourism, and cultural programming.

Similarly, Singapore's HDB-managed neighbourhood centres work because of a strong hybrid model of public infrastructure paired with tenant autonomy, market-aligned pricing, and support services tailored to business growth.

The idea that this model still being proposed by the government will continuously cycle new entrepreneurs is noble, but from an evidence-based standpoint inherently flawed. Most micro-businesses need three-five years just to stabilise, meaning the rotation and turnover envisioned by the government is either unrealistic or indicative of high failure rates.

If the objective is to stimulate real entrepreneurial growth, that capital invested could have funded multiple district-level entrepreneurship hubs or small co-operative markets, each far more accessible, adaptable, and sustainable.

It could have seeded revolving loan funds for urban young men, women-led businesses, offer grants for digital training, or support urban agricultural start-ups that simultaneously tackle food security and job creation.

It would therefore have been far more effective to invest in regional entrepreneurship hubs that provide not just space, but wraparound services including legal guidance, e-commerce training, accounting assistance, and investor matchmaking.

For the specific space at Independence Square, a more sustainable solution would be a public-private partnership with incubators like Cariri or The UWI and the building of ecosystems, offering continuity, mentorship, and access to finance, rather than a simple subsidised building without long-term growth.

The recurring mention of infrastructure spending in East Port of Spain of $85 million since 2017, and an additional $18 million on social programming, raises further concerns. If this level of investment has yet to yield durable transformation in communities, then something in the structure or philosophy of the interventions must be re-examined. Piecemeal grants and temporary training programmes are no substitute for sustained social investment with measurable goals.

As a result we are at a time where, more than ever, we need to shift from capital-heavy, top-down “solutions” to integrated development strategies that are community-driven, market-aligned, and outcomes-focused. Subsidised storefronts without business development services are misguided.

If TT wishes to make the best use of prime urban real estate, especially in a downtown core that is already suffering from underuse and neglect, current best practice dictates a deployment of a mix of strategic public ownership and operational private partnerships in the form of urban innovation districts, where property is managed by public-private boards focused on economic transformation, not rent collection, as well as through leasing instead of constructing, activating existing underutilised properties through incentives rather than adding to the sate’s maintenance liabilities.

This is a nation with no shortage of bright ideas. What we lack is not ambition, but rather sustainability. For the mall to have any meaningful impact it must be rooted in systems that empower, not enable. The government must resist the urge to offer illusions of progress and instead commit to building models that can stand on their own economically, socially, and structurally.

JASON ROPER-BROOKS

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