AG Armour’s litany of errors

THE SAYING is well-known: “Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.”

But this is not just an aphorism that happens to summarise one of the basic prerequisites of justice. It is actually the law.

The saying comes from the 1923 case of Rex vs Sussex Justices. In that case, a man alleged a group of judges who convicted him of a traffic offence had acted improperly because someone who was in the deliberation room when they decided the case was linked to the lawyers prosecuting him.

That person was not a fellow judge. Nor was he even a lawyer. The person who had the conflict was a lowly clerk.

It was enough for the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Hewart, to quash the conviction, saying: “It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

Lord Hewart added: “Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice.”

The first error of Attorney General Reginald Armour, SC, as far as we can discern from the facts that have come to light in relation to the State’s US litigation over the Piarco Airport project, was his failure to remove himself completely from the case early enough.

It mattered not whether Mr Armour, 65, had been a junior or senior official within the defence team of the Piarco accused years ago or yesterday; or whether he took notes as opposed to making detailed legal submissions. What mattered was that he was a member of the team at all.

This fundamental error on the part of the Attorney General was bad enough. It has now snowballed into even more missteps.

We have been told lawyers are to appeal a decision in the US to disqualify Mr Armour and the firm handling the case. That move compounds the spectacle of a sitting attorney general of this country being subject to such an adverse ruling (though the court made no findings of misconduct).

Mr Armour has now, in yet another error, also taken a vow of silence out of concern for the administration of the Piarco case. Unfortunately, that horse has already bolted.

Troubling questions abound, too, as to whether the reassigned official for this matter has been validly appointed under Section 79 of the Constitution.

It is a shame that, even before the arrival of a verdict in the decades-old Piarco cases, this country has already paid, and continues to pay, through Mr Armour’s litany of unforced errors, a heavy price.